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1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing supports a vision of IT where resources and services are provided
on demand on a pay-as-you-go basis [Armbrust et al. 2009; 2010]. It provides infras-
tructure, platform, and software services – known as IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS, respec-
tively [Mell and Grance 2011] – lowering the effort needed to manage computational
infrastructures. Experience has shown that the cloud can make IT cheaper, simpler,
flexible, and accessible to everyone without requiring the expertise needed to own, op-
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erate, and manage traditional on-premises systems. Cloud customers are free to focus
on service development, while cloud providers can concentrate on management activi-
ties providing an infrastructure that gives to customers the illusion of the availability
of infinite resources [Ardagna et al. 2012].
Even though cloud computing provides all these benefits, a number of potential
users are still reluctant to adopt it. Cloud computing in fact makes service providers
and customers lose, at least partly, control over the status of their data and applica-
tions, impairing their ability to assess risks. According to several surveys conducted
by cloud computing service providers, security solution providers, and independent re-
searchers [Al Morsy et al. 2010; Armour et al. 2013; Ballabio 2013; Bhadauria and
Sanyal 2012; Bisong and Rahman 2011; Bohli et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2010; Ibrahim
et al. 2010; Kalloniatis et al. 2013; Kaufman 2010; Mansfield-Devine 2008; Muttik and
Barton 2009; Pearson 2013; Ren et al. 2012; Rong et al. 2013; Ryan 2013; Sengupta
et al. 2011; Srinivasan et al. 2012; Subashini and Kavitha 2011; Xiao and Xiao 2013;
Younis et al. 2013], perceived lack of security is one of the main reasons discouraging
customers and business owners from adopting cloud solutions.
In the last few years, the security research community has worked hard to improve
the security of the cloud infrastructure and the trust of cloud users that their applica-
tions and information are correctly managed and protected. However, the proliferation
of ad hoc security solutions that target a very small part of the whole problem makes
a fair and sound evaluation of the state of the art in cloud security difficult. Here,
we start from the notion that the cloud computing paradigm can be fully exploited
only if the involvement of customers and service providers in security management
is widened, increasing their trust. Following this notion, software security assurance
techniques enhance cloud transparency [Ardagna et al. 2014], and increase the confi-
dence of the cloud actors that the cloud and its services behave as expected. In line with
standard software security assurance definitions [IATAC and DACS 2007], cloud secu-
rity assurance can be defined as the way to gain justifiable confidence that infrastruc-
ture and/or applications will consistently demonstrate one or more security properties,
and operationally behave as expected despite failures and attacks. Assurance is a much
wider notion than security, as it includes methodologies for collecting and validating
evidence supporting security properties. In this survey, we analyze the cloud security
state of the art focusing on the emergence of cloud security assurance (cloud assurance
for brevity). We define a taxonomy of cloud security/assurance, and provide an analy-
sis of i) cloud security techniques and ii) corresponding assurance processes. We also
provide an overview of the results of our survey. Finally, we discuss some recommen-
dations for the design and development of next-generation cloud security/assurance
techniques.
The remainder of this survey is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the taxon-
omy and methodology at the basis of the survey. Section 3 presents cloud-specific vul-
nerabilities, threats, and attacks. Section 4 provides an overview of existing security
solutions. Section 5 discusses assurance techniques for cloud security verification, test-
ing, monitoring, and certification. Section 6 presents a summary of the survey results
on the basis of the proposed methodology, highlights our recommendations for next-
generation security and assurance solutions, and draws our conclusions. Finally, to
provide a complete and up-to-date survey of cloud security and assurance issues, chal-
lenges, requirements, and solutions, Appendix A covers additional papers that span
more than one category identified in Section 2, Appendix B presents a summary of
all reviewed papers according to the methodology described in Section 2,1 Appendix C
1We note that summary tables (i.e., Tables I, II, III) in the paper and results in Section 6.1 refer to all
reviewed papers summarized in Appendix B.
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compares the survey in this paper with previous surveys and whitepapers on cloud se-
curity, discussing its originality and added value, and Appendix D describes standards
for cloud security and gives an overview of research projects on cloud security.
2. METHODOLOGY
We first discuss the criteria adopted for the selection of the papers reviewed in this
survey. We then describe our cloud security taxonomy that consists of three main cate-
gories and is based on the when, where, what, and how approach introduced in [Buck-
ley et al. 2005].
2.1. Selection criteria
Our survey takes an approach different from the one followed by existing surveys in
similar areas (see Appendix C). We claim that cloud paradigm development involved
three major phases. The first phase coincided with the set up of the cloud infrastruc-
ture, and included the design and development of all functional aspect of clouds. The
results of this effort led to the implementation of current cloud protocol stacks. The
second phase moved from functional to non-functional properties and focused on the
design and development of techniques for management of cloud security, dependabil-
ity, and performance. Finally, the third (and current) phase coincides with the move
to assurance. Assurance techniques for the cloud are aimed at verifying, proving, and
guaranteeing non-functional properties of cloud-based processes and applications. In
this survey, we present an overview of approaches to cloud security and assurance,
identifying existing trends and highlighting gaps that have to be addressed to foster
cloud adoption in security-critical scenarios. Given the huge amount of literature, we
identified the following set of selection criteria.
—Coverage: paper selection was as inclusive as possible. We reviewed security solutions
that address all security requirements relevant to the cloud and discussed security
mechanisms for all levels of the cloud protocol stack.
—Actionability: papers were selected on the basis of the impact on concrete solutions
and final products. This choice allowed us to identify what can be really implemented
and integrated in real systems today.
—Timeliness: paper selection spanned nearly a decade, considering also solutions pro-
vided in the early years of the cloud infrastructure definition. However, to make the
survey up-to-date, we introduced the criterion of timeliness, which favored the selec-
tion of papers published in recent years. This choice has been made to facilitate the
selection of approaches defined in a period where the cloud computing infrastructure
reached a good level of maturity and stability. Solutions presented in the early years
of the cloud in fact could be unstable or not applicable in current cloud environments.
In addition, the trend of cloud security publications between 2008-2012 clearly shows
that most of the security-related papers were presented after 2010 [Fernandes et al.
2013].
—Quality: paper selection followed a strict quality evaluation. To this aim, scientific
and archival publications were privileged, further favoring papers in ACM, IEEE,
and Elsevier journals and conferences.
2.2. Cloud security and assurance taxonomy
Besides following sound selection criteria, a survey must provide careful organization
of the reviewed material. We started by identifying some key aspects of security and
assurance corresponding to major security properties [Irvine and Levin 1999; Focardi
et al. 2004]. The version given below is taken from [Anisetti et al. 2013b]:
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Cloud Security and Assurance
Cloud Security
Encryption
Signature
IDS/IPS
Access Control
Authentication
Trusted Computing
Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Attacks
Application-level
Tenant-on-provider
Provider-on-tenant
Tenant-on-tenant
Cloud Assurance
TestingSLAMonitoring
Audit/Compliance Certification
Fig. 1. Cloud security and assurance taxonomy
—Confidentiality: the capability of limiting information access and disclosure to autho-
rized clients only.
— Integrity: the capability of preserving structure and content of information resources.
—Availability: the capability of guaranteeing continuous access to data and resources
by authorized clients.
—Authenticity: the capability of ensuring that clients or objects are genuine.
— Privacy: the capability of protecting all information pertaining to the personal sphere
of users.
Furthermore, our analysis considered three main categories of contributions (Fig-
ure 1): i) papers presenting new security vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks in the
cloud, ii) papers presenting novel security techniques and mechanisms protecting data
and application security in the cloud, iii) papers presenting original assurance tech-
niques, which are used to verify, prove, and guarantee the properties provided by the
implemented security techniques and mechanisms.
Security attacks are further refined in three macro-areas by specifying the attack
surface: i) application-level, where attacks can be made by any cloud actor and tar-
get the SaaS level, including its services and data, ii) tenant-on-tenant, where attacks
are made by malicious cloud tenants on other cloud tenants, and target the PaaS and
IaaS levels, including their resources, processes, and data, iii) provider-on-tenant and
tenant-on-provider, where attacks are made by malicious cloud providers (tenants,
resp.) on target tenants (cloud providers, resp.) and target the IaaS level, including
its resources, processes, and data. Our classification of security techniques is further
refined in six macro-areas depending on the implemented security mechanisms: i) en-
cryption, ii) signature, iii) Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/ Intrusion Preventions
System (IPS), iv) access control, v) authentication, vi) trusted computing. Assurance
techniques can be used at all layers of the cloud stack to prove the security claims
made by a provider on its security mechanisms and can be further refined in five
macro-areas: i) testing, ii) monitoring, iii) certification, iv) audit/compliance, v) Ser-
vice Level Agreement (SLA). All macro-areas are aimed at increasing the trust of the
users in the cloud and giving them an increased capability of evaluating the security
status of the cloud stack where their applications/data reside.
2.3. When, Where, What, How
Finally, we complemented our aspects and contribution categories with labels describ-
ing the contributions’ spatio-temporal coordinates. Starting from the work in [Buckley
et al. 2005], we adapted the four dimensions when, where, what, and how to present
a clear picture of the evolution of security and assurance solutions in the cloud. In
particular, our analysis specifies when, where, what, and how security and assurance
solutions strengthen a cloud computing environment.
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—When focuses on the timeframe in which a given solution has been proposed.
—Where relates to the attack surface that is the target of a given security and assurance
solution.
—What refers to the property a given security and assurance solution considers.
—How considers the way in which a given solution increases security and assurance
of the cloud, or in other words by which mechanisms a given security property is
supported.
As an example, let us consider an approach published in May 2014 and aimed to
strengthen security of data storage using a specific cryptosystem. According to our
four dimensions the considered approach can be described as follows.
—When:May 2014.
—Where: tenant-on-tenant attack surface.
—What: integrity.
—How: the specific cryptosystem used to strengthen integrity of the data storage.
The above dimensions are used in Section 6.1 to provide an overview of security and
assurance techniques in cloud environments.
3. VULNERABILITIES, THREATS, ATTACKS, AND RISK EVALUATION
Several works have been devoted to the evaluation of risks in the cloud, and to the
identification of vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks that would target the cloud in-
frastructure (e.g., [Chen et al. 2008; Somorovsky et al. 2011; Cloud Security Alliance
2013; Modi et al. 2013a; Porter 2013]). Fernandes et al. [Fernandes et al. 2013] pro-
vided one of the most complete description of vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks to
the cloud infrastructure. Gruschka and Jensen [Gruschka and Jensen 2010] presented
a taxonomy and a classification of cloud security attacks based on the notion of attack
surface. After modeling the cloud as a set of three entities including users, services,
and cloud providers, they define each attack as a set of interactions within this model.
First, they claim that attacks targeting the interactions between users and services
are similar to the ones known for traditional distributed communications (e.g., Denial
of Service – DoS, SQL injection, Cross Site Scripting – XSS). However, attacks proper
of a cloud environment also involve interfaces managed by the cloud provider. Then,
they identify six attack surfaces that are used, possibly in a combination, to perform an
attack. Finally, they describe some successful attacks on sample cloud environments.
Here we take a similar approach to threat modeling, categorizing papers on vul-
nerabilities, threats, and attacks according to our broader classification of attack
surface discussed in Section 2.2: application-level, tenant-on-tenant, and provider-on-
tenant/tenant-on-provider. Table I shows our classification of papers discussing rele-
vant vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks, and their mapping to attack surfaces and
involved security properties.
3.1. Application-level
Application-level vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks have threatened ICT infrastruc-
ture since the early days of the Internet, and mainly target the interactions between
users and services. In other words, they focus on services and data at the highest level
of a cloud stack, and consider the SaaS service model. In the following, we provide an
overview of vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks that focus on the cloud and its pecu-
liarities.
Gruschka and Iacono [Gruschka and Iacono 2009] present a weakness in the SOAP-
based control service of Amazon EC2 against signature wrapping attacks, originally
described in [McIntosh and Austel 2005]. The attacker was able to modify an eaves-
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Table I. Vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks classification based on attack surfaces and target security properties
Attack surface Property References
Application-level Confidentiality [Bugiel et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Grobauer et al. 2011][Gruschka and Jensen 2010][Jensen et al. 2009]
[Paquette et al. 2010][Saripalli and Walters 2010][Somorovsky et al. 2011]
Integrity [Booth et al. 2013][Bugiel et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Grobauer et al. 2011][Gruschka and Jensen 2010]
[Gruschka and Iacono 2009][Jensen et al. 2009][Paquette et al. 2010][Saripalli and Walters 2010]
Availability [Booth et al. 2013][Chonka et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Grobauer et al. 2011][Gruschka and Jensen 2010]
[Jensen et al. 2009][Liu 2010][Paquette et al. 2010][Saripalli and Walters 2010]
Authenticity [Fernandes et al. 2013][Grobauer et al. 2011][Gruschka and Jensen 2010][Jensen et al. 2009][Paquette et al. 2010]
[Somorovsky et al. 2011]
Privacy [Bugiel et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Paquette et al. 2010]
Tenant-on-tenant Confidentiality [Aviram et al. 2010][Bleikertz et al. 2013][Booth et al. 2013][Dahbur et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013]
[Godfrey and Zulkernine 2013][Green 2013][Grobauer et al. 2011][Gruschka and Jensen 2010]
[Okamura and Oyama 2010][Paquette et al. 2010][Pearce et al. 2013][Ristenpart et al. 2009]
[Saripalli and Walters 2010][Tsai et al. 2012][Zhang et al. 2012]
Integrity [Booth et al. 2013][Dahbur et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Grobauer et al. 2011][Gruschka and Jensen 2010]
[Paquette et al. 2010][Pearce et al. 2013][Saripalli and Walters 2010][Tsai et al. 2012]
Availability [Booth et al. 2013][Chonka et al. 2011][Dahbur et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Gruschka and Jensen 2010]
[Paquette et al. 2010][Pearce et al. 2013][Saripalli and Walters 2010][Tsai et al. 2012]
Authenticity [Dahbur et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Gruschka and Jensen 2010][Paquette et al. 2010][Pearce et al. 2013]
Privacy [Aviram et al. 2010][Bleikertz et al. 2013][Dahbur et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Okamura and Oyama 2010]
[Paquette et al. 2010]
Provider-on-tenant Confidentiality [Bleikertz et al. 2013][Booth et al. 2013][Dahbur et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Gruschka and Jensen 2010]
Tenant-on-provider [Paquette et al. 2010][Rocha and Correia 2011]
Integrity [Fernandes et al. 2013][Gruschka and Jensen 2010][Paquette et al. 2010]
Availability [Dahbur et al. 2011][Fernandes et al. 2013][Gruschka and Jensen 2010][Liu 2010][Paquette et al. 2010]
Authenticity [Fernandes et al. 2013][Paquette et al. 2010]
Privacy [Bleikertz et al. 2013][Booth et al. 2013][Fernandes et al. 2013][Gruschka and Jensen 2010][Paquette et al. 2010]
dropped message faking the digital signature checking algorithm, and executed com-
mands on behalf of legitimate users. Jensen et al. [Jensen et al. 2009] present secu-
rity issues in cloud computing, considering XML signature, browser security, cloud
integrity, and flooding attacks. They also introduce the cloud malware injection attack,
where a malicious user tries to add a malicious service implementation and confuse the
cloud provider by letting it consider the malicious service as a normal one. Somorovsky
et al. [Somorovsky et al. 2011] test the security of the cloud control interfaces of Ama-
zon public cloud and of a private cloud based on Eucalyptus. The results show that
in both cases the control interfaces can be compromised by means of signature wrap-
ping attacks. The authors propose a novel methodology for the analysis of public cloud
interfaces and discuss possible countermeasures to the identified attacks. Chonka et
al. [Chonka et al. 2011] focus on two attacks that can target the cloud, namely HTTP
Denial of Service and XML-based Denial of Service [Srivatsa and Iyengar 2011]. In
particular, they recreate the above attacks, present a solution to identify the source
of an attack, and introduce an approach (Cloud Protector) to detect and filter these
attacks. In principle, this kind of attacks could also apply to tenant-on-tenant attack
surface. Bugiel et al. [Bugiel et al. 2011] provide an analysis of threats to confiden-
tiality and privacy in the cloud that successfully extract sensitive information from
Amazon machine images and exploit SSH vulnerabilities.
3.2. Tenant-on-Tenant
Tenant-on-tenant vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks are typical of virtualized envi-
ronments where different tenants share a common infrastructure and may reside on
the same physical hardware. Researchers working in this area mainly considered sce-
narios where a malicious tenant tries to attack other tenants co-located on the same
hardware, exploiting misconfiguration and vulnerabilities on the virtualization infras-
tructure (e.g., Virtual Machine – VM – isolation). In other words, tenant-on-tenant
vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks focus on resources, processes, and data at the low-
est levels of a cloud stack, and consider the Paas and IaaS service models. Next, we
provide an overview of papers that focus on tenant-on-tenant attack surface.
Ristenpart et al. [Ristenpart et al. 2009] describe an attack to information confiden-
tiality of running service instances. Their attack is based on the fact that an attacker
virtual machine and the target service are on the same hardware, and therefore the
former can launch an attack by generating traffic and monitoring its own (or the hyper-
visors) performance. Aviram et al. [Aviram et al. 2010] discuss the problem of timing
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channels in the cloud and present an approach to prevent timing attacks based on
provider-enforced deterministic execution, while Okamura and Oyama [Okamura and
Oyama 2010] consider the threat of CPU-based covert channels [Desmedt 2011] be-
tween virtual machines on the Xen hypervisor. Zhang et al. [Zhang et al. 2012] present
a side-channel attack [Caddy 2011] allowing malicious virtual machines to steal pri-
vate information of a target virtual machine running on the same virtual network
based on Xen hypervisor. Tsai et al. [Tsai et al. 2012] study the impact of virtualization
attacks on different cloud service models, while Pearce et al. [Pearce et al. 2013] dis-
cuss concerns due to inter-tenant interference in a virtualized environment. Godfrey
and Zulkernine [Godfrey and Zulkernine 2013] first analyze the status of side-channel
vulnerabilities involving the CPU cache, then identify drawbacks of existing defenses
when applied in the cloud, and finally present a server-side solution to side-channel
attack mitigation in the cloud. Green [Green 2013] presents an overview with prac-
tical examples of side-channel attacks in the cloud, allowing a malicious VM to steal
sensitive information on a target VM.
3.3. Provider-on-Tenant and Tenant-on-Provider
Provider-on-tenant and tenant-on-provider vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks are
specific of the cloud where users, enterprises, and business owners move their assets
to an untrusted infrastructure. Researchers working in this area mainly considered
scenarios where the cloud provider is malicious (or at least honest but curious) and
attacks its tenants (provider-on-tenant). Alternatively, they consider contexts in which
one or more compromised tenants (e.g., botnets for denial of service attacks) are used
to attack the cloud infrastructure (tenant-on-provider). In other words, provider-on-
tenant and tenant-on-provider vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks focus on resources,
processes, and data delivered using the IaaS service model. In the following, we pro-
vide an overview of papers that focus on provider-on-tenant and tenant-on-provider
attack surface.
Liu [Liu 2010] introduces a new form of denial-of-service attack, which targets
and saturates the virtual network bandwidth. Clearly, this kind of attack can also
be launched on application-level attack surface, where the target of the attack is a
given application on a given machine. Rocha and Correia [Rocha and Correia 2011]
present an overview of threats to cloud confidentiality brought by malicious insiders
(which can include the cloud provider), discuss possible protection mechanisms, and
describe their limitations. Bleikertz et al. [Bleikertz et al. 2013] focus on the problem
of protecting a customer from attacks brought by cloud providers, also considering the
scenario including malicious outsiders (tenant-on-tenant attack surface). In particular,
they consider the problem of securing cryptographic operations because, in principle,
providers can access stored keys and consumers are not allowed to deploy their keys
at runtime only. The authors then define an architecture implementing a client-driven
Cryptography-as-a-Service (CaaS). CaaS provides an execution domain for the client,
where all encryption operations are secured and managed. It extends Xen Hypervisor
and relies on trusted computing solutions.
3.4. Discussion
This section surveyed a number of research works on vulnerabilities, threats, and at-
tacks distinguishing them on the basis of the targeted attack surfaces in the taxonomy
in Figure 1. Other vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks are presented in the papers re-
viewed in Section 4, although their main goal is to define new approaches to strengthen
cloud security.
Table I presents our main findings, including also papers reviewed in Appendix A.1.
First of all, we note that surveyed papers mainly focus on application-level and tenant-
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Table II. Cloud security solution classification on the basis of implemented techniques and target security properties
Security technique Property References
Encryption Confidentiality [Ahmed et al. 2012][Bennani et al. 2010][Bernsmed et al. 2012][Bowers et al. 2009][Chu et al. 2014]
[De Capitani di Vimercati et al. 2013][De Capitani di Vimercati et al. 2014][Dsouza et al. 2013][Jajodia et al. 2013]
[Juels and Oprea 2013][Kaaniche et al. 2013][Li et al. 2011b][Lin and Tzeng 2012][Pearson et al. 2009][Pattuk et al. 2013]
[Peterson 2010][Sedayao et al. 2009][Thebeau II et al. 2014][Tysowski and Hasan 2013][van Dijk et al. 2012]
[Zissis and Lekkas 2012]
Integrity [Ahmed et al. 2012][Bernsmed et al. 2012][Bowers et al. 2009][Dsouza et al. 2013][Juels and Oprea 2013][Li et al. 2011b]
[Lin and Tzeng 2012][Park et al. 2013][Peterson 2010][Thebeau II et al. 2014][Wei and Reiter 2012][Wei and Reiter 2013]
[Zissis and Lekkas 2012]
Availability [Ahmed et al. 2012][Bowers et al. 2009][Dsouza et al. 2013][Juels and Oprea 2013][Lin and Tzeng 2012]
[Thebeau II et al. 2014]
Authenticity [Chu et al. 2014][Wei and Reiter 2013][Zissis and Lekkas 2012]
Privacy [Diallo et al. 2012][Jajodia et al. 2013][Kaaniche et al. 2013][Pearson et al. 2009][Pattuk et al. 2013]
[Tysowski and Hasan 2013][Wang et al. 2012][Wei and Reiter 2012][Wei and Reiter 2013][Yu et al. 2013a]
Signature Confidentiality [Chow et al. 2012]
Integrity [Attasena et al. 2013][Shraer et al. 2010][Wang et al. 2013a]
Availability [Attasena et al. 2013]
Authenticity [Chow et al. 2012][Wei et al. 2014][Xu et al. 2013a]
Privacy [Attasena et al. 2013][Chow et al. 2012][Wang et al. 2013a][Wei et al. 2014]
Access control Confidentiality [Bacon et al. 2014][Barsoum and Hasan 2013][Birgisson et al. 2014][De Capitani di Vimercati et al. 2014][Kurmus et al. 2011]
[Lang 2010][Li et al. 2011b][Liu et al. 2013][Nabeel et al. 2013][Okuhara et al. 2010][Peterson 2010][Singhal et al. 2013]
[Takabi and Joshi 2012][Takabi et al. 2010a][Tang et al. 2012][Wan et al. 2012][Yang et al. 2013][Yu et al. 2010b][Zhu et al. 2012]
Integrity [Bleikertz et al. 2012][Barsoum and Hasan 2013][Kurmus et al. 2011][Lombardi and Di Pietro 2010][Lombardi and Di Pietro 2011]
Availability [Kurmus et al. 2011]
Authenticity [Barsoum and Hasan 2013][Liu et al. 2013][Nabeel et al. 2013][Ruj et al. 2014][Tang et al. 2012][Wan et al. 2012][Yang et al. 2013]
Privacy [Birgisson et al. 2014][Bleikertz et al. 2012][Jung et al. 2013][Raykova et al. 2012][Ruj et al. 2014][Takabi et al. 2010a]
[Yu et al. 2010b][Zhu et al. 2012]
Authentication Confidentiality [Li et al. 2011a][Qin et al. 2013]
Integrity [Hao et al. 2011][Stefanov et al. 2012]
Availability [Stefanov et al. 2012]
Authenticity [Almulla and Yeun 2010][Ghazizadeh et al. 2012][Hao et al. 2011][Li et al. 2011a][Okuhara et al. 2010][Peterson 2010]
[Qin et al. 2013][Song et al. 2009][Stefanov et al. 2012][Takabi et al. 2010a]
Privacy [Khalid et al. 2013]
Trusted computing Confidentiality [Bernsmed et al. 2012][Boampong and Wahsheh 2012][Krautheim 2009][Ma et al. 2013][Santos et al. 2012][Singhal et al. 2013]
[Szefer and Lee 2014]
Integrity [Bernsmed et al. 2012][Boampong and Wahsheh 2012][Krautheim 2009][Santos et al. 2012][Singhal et al. 2013]
[Szefer and Lee 2014][Velten and Stumpf 2013]
Availability [Ma et al. 2013]
Authenticity [Boampong and Wahsheh 2012]
Privacy [Li et al. 2013]
IDS/IPS Confidentiality [Ficco et al. 2013][Luo et al. 2014][Modi et al. 2013b][Patel et al. 2013][Stolfo et al. 2012][Xing et al. 2013]
Integrity [Christodorescu et al. 2009][Ficco et al. 2013][Luo et al. 2014][Modi et al. 2013b][Patel et al. 2013][Xing et al. 2013]
Availability [Ficco et al. 2013][Modi et al. 2013b][Patel et al. 2013][Xing et al. 2013][Yu et al. 2013b]
Authenticity [Lee et al. 2011]
Privacy [Benali et al. 2010][Stolfo et al. 2012]
on-tenant attack surfaces. This is due to the fact that, on one side, application-level
attack surface has been considered since the introduction of the Internet and there-
fore corresponding vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks have been attempted since the
cloud was first introduced; on the other side, tenant-on-tenant attack surface has been
considered in several works aimed to secure virtualized environments, which can be
considered as the predecessors of current cloud systems. The provider-on-tenant and
tenant-on-provider attack surface is specific to the cloud and therefore less explored,
although the interest on it is growing in the context of attacks to confidentiality and
privacy of customer data, and availability of cloud infrastructures.
4. CLOUD SECURITY
Cloud security problems are very challenging, due to i) the heterogeneity of cloud
stacks, ii) lack of formal and semantically equivalent security requirements (which
often vary depending on the considered domain), iii) lack of a stable categorization of
techniques, iv) need of balancing between security, flexibility, and high performance,
and v) lack of transparency on activities and events happening in the cloud back-end.
Many research works present partial, ad hoc solutions, each targeting a small part of
the problem. This situation makes a general evaluation of the state of the art on cloud
security difficult. Further complicating factors include potential interference between
security mechanisms at different levels of the cloud stack.
In this section we present an overview of cloud security solutions. We have classified
cloud security approaches according to the taxonomy of security techniques discussed
in Section 2.2 (see Figure 1): encryption, signature, access control, IDS/IPS, authenti-
cation, trusted computing. Table II shows our classification together with a mapping
between security solutions and supported security properties.
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4.1. Encryption
The first line of research relies on encryption techniques to increase cloud security
by protecting data, communication, and activities in the cloud from adversaries who
aim to disrupt the cloud’s normal operation, reducing the availability of cloud services,
and/or inferring/accessing secret data of cloud tenants and their activities.
Most papers proposed encryption techniques to primarily achieve confidentiality,
while also targeting additional properties like integrity, availability, authenticity and
privacy. In 2009, Bowers et al. [Bowers et al. 2009] presentedHigh-Availability and In-
tegrity Layer (HAIL), a system that supports data file integrity and availability across
different servers or independent storage services. HAIL uses a proof-of-retrievability
approach to test remote storage servers and replace them if failures are detected. In
the same year, Pearson et al. [Pearson et al. 2009] described different possible privacy
architectures, and proposed a privacy manager component to increase the protection of
private data using encryption-based obfuscation. They also provided a sample applica-
tion aimed to protect metadata of shared photos. Still in 2009, Sedayao et al. [Sedayao
et al. 2009] focused on protecting the confidentiality of data at rest against other users
of the same storage and the system administrator. The solution they proposed is based
on public key encryption and on the protection of private keys used to encrypt data.
Later, in 2012, Ahmed et al. [Ahmed et al. 2012] designed a secure storage based on
Reed-Solomon code to support not only data security and integrity but also availability
and fault-tolerance, while Lin and Tzeng [Lin and Tzeng 2012] introduced a combina-
tion of proxy re-encryption and decentralized erasure code to form a secure storage that
provides confidentiality, privacy and availability. Van Dick et al. [van Dijk et al. 2012]
present the hourglass protocol, which provides a cryptographic approach to securely
store data at rest, allows users to verify the status of their data (proving the correct-
ness of file encryption), and increases the trustworthiness of the cloud in data man-
agement. Hourglass poses economical disincentives (significant resource constraints)
to cloud providers that aim to store data in clear and at the same time pass the veri-
fication process (i.e., apply hourglass encoding on demand). Zissis and Lekkas [Zissis
and Lekkas 2012] present an approach based on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to se-
cure user applications. The TTP is responsible for securely setting up a trust mesh
between entities composing cloud constellations. The third party is used to guarantee
the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of shared information and messages. In
2013, De Capitani di Vimercati et al. [De Capitani di Vimercati et al. 2013] proposed a
solution to assess the integrity of the results of join queries. Their approach considers
a honest-but-curious storage server and malicious external computational providers,
which produce the join results calculated over externally stored databases. Jajodia et
al. [Jajodia et al. 2013] consider the problem of how to securely backup encryption keys
for i) increasing data safety and availability, ii) reducing the risk of data loss due to
unavailability of keys, and iii) limiting the risk of key disclosure and confidentiality
breach. The authors present a scheme called recoverable encryption through a noised
secret that allows to store key backups on a single machine, and is robust to decryption
by brute force attacks. Decryption is in fact computationally intensive and time con-
suming. Juels and Oprea [Juels and Oprea 2013] focus on the migration of enterprise
data to the public cloud, while maintaining a level of trust and visibility on the cor-
rectness of tenant operations. Their approach is based on cryptographic protocols and
aims to provide strong protection on migrated data. It relies on an auditing framework
to verify internal properties of the cloud and provide the desired level of assurance
that enterprise data are managed to preserve security and reliability. Kaaniche et
al. [Kaaniche et al. 2013] introduce a solution based on ID-Cryptography [Libert and
Quisquater 2011] to protect the confidentiality of data in cloud-based storage. Also,
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it offers a set of functionalities supporting controlled access to data and preventing
unauthorized access against untrusted parties. Bennani et al. [Bennani et al. 2010]
provide a solution based on homomorphic variation of a joint encryption technique
providing simple key management and revocation schemes for the cloud. Their solu-
tion is based on virtual role keys implemented as a set of shares distributed between
different servers, which are then used to enforce access policies of data owners and
collaboratively execute encrypted queries of users. Pattuk et al. [Pattuk et al. 2013] de-
scribe a framework called BigSecret for secure outsourcing and protection of encrypted
data over key-value stores. BigSecret provides three encryption models at the basis of
the approach supporting i) secure data management on semi-trusted providers and ii)
queries on encrypted data. The models use crypto indices, based on bucketization or
pseudo random functions, and allow delete, get, and scan operations over encrypted
data. BigSecret also provides a heuristic supporting secure distribution of data and
workloads to increase performance and efficiency. It considers a cloud scenario consist-
ing of multiple providers with monetary and disclosure risk constraints. Tysowski and
Hasan [Tysowski and Hasan 2013] propose a protocol for secure outsourcing of data
to the cloud. The protocol, relying on an attribute-based encryption scheme, a group
keying mechanism, and re-encryption, protects data against the cloud provider. It sup-
ports revocation and allows users with the right attributes to access data. The protocol
is also designed to support resource-constrained mobile devices, delegating computa-
tion to the cloud provider/third parties. Recently, Chu et al. [Chu et al. 2014] designed
a key-aggregate cryptosystem that allows to aggregate secret keys compacting them
into a single key. The resulting key includes the power of all the aggregated keys.
Encryption techniques have been also used to exclusively ensure properties differ-
ent than confidentiality. Diallo et al. [Diallo et al. 2012] present a middleware, called
CloudProtect, which provides encryption functionalities for protecting data privacy in
the cloud. CloudProtect implements a set of functionalities transparent to applications
that allow to store encrypted data on the service provider and operate directly on them
whenever possible. In case plaintext data are necessary, CloudProtect implements a
protocol exposing them for a limited amount of time. Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2012]
and Yu et al. [Yu et al. 2013a] introduce solutions supporting secure search, in partic-
ular ranked keyword search and multikeyword top-k search, over encrypted storage.
Wei and Reiter [Wei and Reiter 2013] present a protocol that allows pattern-matching
applications to access data also in encrypted form. Their approach is based on the
evaluation of a deterministic file automaton on an encrypted file stored in the cloud.
The paper builds on the work in [Wei and Reiter 2012] and extends it by permitting
the client to identify any cloud provider misbehavior. Park et al. [Park et al. 2013]
present THEMIS, a security-enhanced system for billing supervision. The proposed
approach provides mutually verifiable binding information for dispute resolution and
a monitoring-based approach for SLA verification based on a trusted platform.
4.2. Signature
Some approaches use encryption-based digital signatures to support integrity, privacy,
or both properties. In particular, Shraer et al. [Shraer et al. 2010] present Venus, a
service that makes the interactions of users with untrusted cloud storage more secure.
Venus ensures integrity and consistency for applications via a key-based object store
service that does not require trusted components or changes to the storage provider.
Attasena et al. [Attasena et al. 2013] introduce a multi-secret sharing scheme based
on block cryptography, secret sharing, and hash functions in which two types of sig-
natures are employed to support data availability and integrity. The first one is an
inner signature created from all data in each shared data block, which is used to verify
data integrity. The second one is an outer signature created from each encrypted data
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block, which allows to quickly identify and correct erroneous data blocks and preserve
data availability. Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2013a] define a solution based on a security
mediator implementing an anonymous approach to cloud data integrity verification.
Verification metadata based on signatures are used to provide anonymous proofs of
data possession. In addition, the security mediator does not learn information about
data uploaded to the cloud. While the three previous works focus on integrity, Chow
et al. [Chow et al. 2012] introduce a solution for data sharing that uses verifier-local
revocable group signature and identity-based broadcast encryption to provide confi-
dentiality, anonymity, and traceability properties. The key idea in this solution is the
design of a group signature that is not only verifier-local revocable but also traceable
and exculpable. Wei et al. [Wei et al. 2014] propose an auditing protocol for discourag-
ing privacy cheating. Their proposal relies on batch verification as well as on ad hoc
probabilistic sampling mechanisms. A work based on signatures that does not target
integrity and privacy is the one by Xu et al. [Xu et al. 2013a]. The authors introduce
Software Service Signature (S3), a solution that aims to address free-riding issues of
SaaS, where malicious participants may try to maximize their benefits in using the ser-
vice. The basic idea of S3 is to increase security through authentication via ID-based
proxy signature from pairings [Libert and Quisquater 2011], so that service requests
are always verifiable.
4.3. Access control
Existing access control systems for distributed environments are not directly appli-
cable to the cloud. As a consequence, the research community has defined new ap-
proaches to access control in the cloud. We review them in this section, together with
security solutions which i) implement authorization mechanisms, and ii) use moni-
toring approaches to distinguish between benign and malicious accesses to cloud re-
sources.
In 2010, Lang et al. [Lang 2010] presented a solution to security and compliance
policy automation and configuration. They supported the generation of technical poli-
cies according to a model-driven transformation. Also, they provided an approach to
incident reporting and management of application authorizations. An implementation
based onOpenPMF, a fully-fledged model-driven security product, is provided support-
ing modeling, auto-generation, enforcement, monitoring, and automatic update of poli-
cies. In the same year, Yu et al. [Yu et al. 2010b] employed a combination of attribute-
based encryption, and proxy and lazy re-encryption. The result is a fine-grained, scal-
able technique for cloud access control. Still in 2010, Lombardi and Di Pietro [Lom-
bardi and Di Pietro 2010] presented a system called Transparent Cloud Protection
System (TCPS), protecting cloud security and transparently monitoring the integrity
of cloud components. Later, Lombardi and Di Pietro developed their approach to pro-
pose Advanced Cloud Protection System (ACPS) [Lombardi and Di Pietro 2011], an
architecture protecting integrity of guest VMs and other infrastructure components.
The architecture takes advantage from cloud virtualization, can be deployed on dif-
ferent cloud stacks, and monitors the integrity of all involved components. Kurmus et
al. [Kurmus et al. 2011] present two architectures aimed to achieve efficient security
of the storage service in a multi-tenant scenario as follows: i) the first isolates cus-
tomers in VMs at hypervisor level, ii) the second uses mandatory access control in a
shared/centralized OS kernel. The period of 2012–2013 was one of intense research on
cloud access control. Tang et al. [Tang et al. 2012] present a policy-based access control
relying on selective encryption with assured file deletion. Their approach employs a set
of encryption operations that are maintained by a set of independent key managers,
whose number is above a given threshold. Zhu et al. [Zhu et al. 2012] provide a tem-
poral access control approach for the cloud, which associates an access policy on tem-
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poral attributes to each outsourced resource. In their approach, proxy re-encryption is
used to match access policies and user’s attributes in the access request. Takabi and
Joshi [Takabi and Joshi 2012] describe Policy Management as a Service (PMaaS), a uni-
fied framework for policy management in the cloud. PMaaS provides a single control
point that is independent from resource location. In order to prevent insider attacks,
Bleikertz et al. [Bleikertz et al. 2012] introduce an approach to perform cloud main-
tenance, protecting privacy and integrity of users’ workloads with respect to system
administrators. Their approach is based on five fine-grained privilege levels. Raykova
et al. [Raykova et al. 2012] propose a solution aimed to protect private information
in access control policies as well as users’ access patterns from the prying eyes of the
cloud provider. The authors define an access control system working at two levels: i)
cloud-side, using a coarse-grained access control to limit the amount of information
accessible to the cloud provider, ii) client-side, using fine-grained selective encryption
access control to guarantee a proper level of expressiveness. The idea of extending
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) for supporting fine-grained ac-
cess control schemes is exploited in three different papers: the ones by Wan et al. [Wan
et al. 2012], Liu et al. [Liu et al. 2013] and Yang et al. [Yang et al. 2013]. CP-ABE is
a possible approach to attribute-based encryption where, differently from traditional
encryption, ciphertexts and users’ decryption keys correspond to an attribute set or an
attribute-based policy [Wan et al. 2012]. In particular, CP-ABE encrypts the cipher-
text with a tree access policy. The associated decryption key is generated according to
a set of attributes. The user can use the decryption key to access the ciphertext if the
set of attributes referring to the key satisfies the tree access policy of the ciphertext.
Wan et al. [Wan et al. 2012] propose a Hierarchical Attribute-Set-Based Encryption
(HASBE) access control scheme with users organized in a a hierarchical structure. Liu
et al. [Liu et al. 2013] introduce another fine-grained access control scheme with au-
thentication, a hierarchy of multi-authorities, and attribute-based signature. Yang et
al. [Yang et al. 2013] design Data Access Control for Multi-Authority Cloud Storage
(DAC-MACS). DAC-MACS is an encryption-based access control scheme, which sup-
ports revocation. Key management is performed by multiple authorities, addressing
forward and backward security. Nabeel et al. [Nabeel et al. 2013] propose an attribute-
based access control for file sharing based on a new key management scheme that is
able to add/revoke users or update attribute-based access control policies simply by
modifying some public information. Barsoum and Hasan [Barsoum and Hasan 2013]
design a solution that not only provides confidentiality, integrity, and authorization
for data, but also efficiently controls versions of data and supports symmetric chain of
trust between the data owner and the cloud provider. A different approach is taken by
Jung et al. [Jung et al. 2013] to design AnonyControl, an anonymous attribute-based
privilege control scheme that exploits multiple authorities to protect user privacy in
a cloud storage server. AnonyControl provides both fine-grained privilege control and
anonymity. Recently, Bacon et al. [Bacon et al. 2014] evaluated the suitability of In-
formation Flow Control (IFC), a mandatory access control approach, to secure cloud
infrastructures. They presented different IFC and Decentralised IFC (DIFC) solutions,
mainly focused on PaaS level (claimed as the most appropriate model for DIFC in-
tegration), and evaluated issues and challenges of adopting IFC and DIFC in cloud
scenarios. Ruj et al. [Ruj et al. 2014] present a decentralized access control scheme for
secure data storage in clouds that is able to verify the authenticity of the submitted in-
formation without the need of knowing user identity, while Birgisson et al. [Birgisson
et al. 2014] introduce authorization credentials (called macaroons) for cloud services
supporting decentralized delegation based on nested and chained Message Authenti-
cation Codes (MACs) [Preneel 2011].
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4.4. Authentication
Some work has also been done on adding authentication and identity management to
the cloud.
In 2009, Song et al. [Song et al. 2009] presented TrustCube, an approach supporting
the management of authentication in the cloud for mobile users. TrustCube provides
an independent, policy-based platform for cloud authentication, integrating a number
of authentication techniques. A year later, in 2010, Almulla and Yeun [Almulla and
Yeun 2010] presented an overview of security and privacy issues in the cloud, focus-
ing on Identity and Access Management (IAM), IAM lifecycle, and IAM standards and
protocols (e.g., Security assertion Markup Language – SAML, Open Authentication –
OAuth – protocol). Then, in 2011, Hao et al. [Hao et al. 2011] designed a time-bound
ticket-based scheme for mutual authentication between the cloud and users, which in-
corporates a service for data integrity verification without access to stored data. Li et
al. [Li et al. 2011a] propose the design of a hierarchical architecture for cloud com-
puting that employs identity-based cryptography to support both data confidentiality
and user authentication. Ghazizadeh et al. [Ghazizadeh et al. 2012] analyze security
issues that could affect federated identity and single sign-on in the cloud, and present
some models that could be used to counteract identity theft in federated environments.
Stefanov et al. [Stefanov et al. 2012] propose the use of Merkle trees [Carminati 2009]
to provide authentication for IRIS, an authenticated cloud-based file system. In IRIS,
a Merkle tree consists of three main components: block-level MAC, file version tree,
and directory tree. Based on the Merkle tree, IRIS is able to support both authentica-
tion and data integrity verification. Besides, IRIS also supports data availability via a
proof-of-retrievability protocol that can quickly identify corrupted or inaccessible data
pieces for data recovery. Khalid et al. [Khalid et al. 2013] introduce an authentication
and authorization protocol that smoothly integrates with an IDentity Management
System (IDMS) to preserve the privacy of users. In their approach, anonymity is pro-
vided in the authentication and authorization protocol by replacing real identities of
users with anonymous identities and keys generated and managed by the IDMS. On
the other hand, Qin et al. [Qin et al. 2013] present a general framework providing
simultaneous authentication and secrecy for data upload, based on an identity-based
“signcryption” scheme that can perform encryption and signature at the same time.
4.5. Trusted computing
Trusted computing relies on Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) [Morris 2011] and re-
lated hardware to prove integrity of software, processes, and data. The advent of the
cloud, however, requires to adapt hardware TPM to virtualized environments.
A seminal paper is the one by Krautheim [Krautheim 2009], which defines a private
virtual infrastructure for the cloud sharing responsibility between users and providers,
and decreasing the overall risk of exposure. The proposed approach is based on the no-
tion of virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM), introduced in [Berger et al. 2006],
which provides secure storage and cryptographic functions of TPM to applications
and operating systems running in virtual machines. vTPM is composed of vTPM in-
stances, each associated with a virtual machine that needs TPM functionalities, and
a vTPM manager that instantiates vTPMs and multiplexes requests coming from vir-
tual machines. Boampong and Wahsheh [Boampong and Wahsheh 2012] later gave
an overview of cloud security focusing on data storage security, cloud security risks,
security policies, physical security, and cloud software security. The authors claim
that authentication, confidentiality, and integrity properties can be achieved by en-
riching cloud with a trusted computing platform. Following the work of Boampong and
Wahsheh, Santos et al. [Santos et al. 2012] introduce Excalibur, a system that provides
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data confidentiality and integrity by encrypting data according to a customer-defined
policy and guaranteeing that data are only decrypted by nodes whose configuration
matches the policy. Ma et al. [Ma et al. 2013] employ trusted computing to address
the security issues of virtual machine replication, which is triggered to improve the
availability of data and services in the cloud.
Not all trusted computing techniques applicable to the cloud are encryption-based.
Li et al. [Li et al. 2013] present MyCloud, an architecture for privacy protection that
departs from traditional encryption mechanisms. MyCloud reduces as much as pos-
sible the trusted computing base (e.g., putting the control of VMs out of its scope)
and permits clients to configure their privacy protection, reducing at the same time
the ability of the cloud provider of modifying privacy settings. Departing from vTPM,
Velten and Stumpf [Velten and Stumpf 2013] provide a solution proving integrity of
several different virtual machines using a single hardware TPM. The presented ap-
proach does not allow an attacker to tamper with the mapping between a VM and
each integrity measurement, and stores the latter in a concealed manner to prevent
information leakage by other tenants during remote attestation. Recently, Szefer and
Lee [Szefer and Lee 2014] proposed a secure hardware infrastructure increasing the
protection of users’ code and data, against attacks from other tenants and malicious
software in the cloud.
4.6. IDS/IPS
The availability of computational resources as commodities on demand, makes the
cloud a powerful weapon in the hands of malicious users, who can use cloud resources
for attacks (e.g., Distributed Denial of Service – DDoS), and a tool in the hands of se-
curity experts, who can use cloud resources to deploy IDS and IPS. Recently, Modi et
al. [Modi et al. 2013b] surveyed different attacks affecting availability, confidential-
ity, and integrity, and reviewed approaches providing IDS and IPS in the cloud. The
authors focus on insider attacks, flooding attacks, user to root attacks, port scanning,
attacks on hypervisor or VMs, and backdoor channel attacks. Then they present the
evolution of IDS and IPS, and explain how IDS and IPS have been used to increase
cloud security. The authors also present a useful summary of existing IDS approaches
(see Table 4 in [Modi et al. 2013b]) discussing their advantages and drawbacks. Patel et
al. [Patel et al. 2013] investigate new issues, challenges, and requirements when intru-
sion detection and prevention functionalities are deployed in the cloud and introduce
a survey of existing technologies, while Ficco et al. [Ficco et al. 2013] provide a survey
of cloud-oriented distributed intrusion detection systems. The latter survey presents
a distributed, hierarchical, and multi-layer architecture for intrusion detection, which
supports complex event correlation analysis.
Some approaches to intrusion detection and prevention in the cloud are summa-
rized below. With respect to traditional IDS, Christodorescu et al. [Christodorescu et al.
2009] consider an important aspect in cloud security, namely, the security of VMs over
which cloud services and functionalities are deployed. They propose an approach to
increase VM introspection [Ardagna et al. 2014] and provide an architecture securing
the customers’ virtualized workloads. The approach makes no assumption on the in-
tegrity of the VMs. The paper also describes a rootkit-detection and rootkit-recovery
service running outside the VM as an application of the presented introspection ap-
proach. Lee et al. [Lee et al. 2011] propose a multi-level intrusion detection system
that checks the users’ authentication information and applies different levels of secu-
rity strength to them based on their degree of anomaly. The anomaly level of users
is determined based on their configuration (such as the IP coverage and vulnerable
ports) and then updated regularly based on their behavior in using the cloud. Benali
et al. [Benali et al. 2010] present a distributed and privacy-preserving network intru-
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sion detection system. Their approach is based on collaborative intrusion detection and
on secure multiparty computation for privacy-enhanced evaluation of the global state
of the network.
Considering IPS, Stolfo et al. [Stolfo et al. 2012] present fog computing, a solution to
mitigate data theft attacks from insiders in the cloud. Their proposal is based on decoy
technology that launches a disinformation attack when an insider attack is detected
through monitoring. Yu et al. [Yu et al. 2013b] define a resource allocation solution
based on intrusion prevention servers, which permits to counteract DDoS attacks. The
proposed solution focuses on protecting servers that are vulnerable to DDoS attacks;
to this aim, it employs different intrusion prevention servers to distinguish malicious
from normal traffic directed to the entity under attack. Variable attack surfaces have
also been used as an attack mitigation strategy. Xing et al. [Xing et al. 2013] present
SnortFlow, an open-flow intrusion prevention system that automatically reconfigures
the cloud networking system to counteract attacks. Recently, Luo et al. [Luo et al.
2014] proposed a federated cloud security architecture that proactively defends the
cloud against cyber threats and attacks, by deploying controls at application, network,
and system levels.
4.7. Discussion
This section surveyed a set of papers whose main goal is to define new approaches to
strengthen cloud security, against different threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks.
Table II presents our main findings, including also papers reviewed in Appendix A.2.
First of all, in line with the results of previous surveys (e.g., [Iankoulova and Daneva
2012]), we found that confidentiality and integrity are still the most researched cate-
gories of properties. Most solutions focused on encryption-based techniques and access
control systems. More recently, however, research on IDS/IPS and trusted computing
experienced an increase, as well as research aimed to protect the privacy of cloud ten-
ants. We also remark that, while signature techniques are often used to strengthen se-
curity, they are mostly used together with other techniques. Availability has been the
target of a minor number of work, focusing on DDoS attacks. This finding is mainly due
to the fact that availability is often seen as a property at the border between the secu-
rity, reliability, and performance research areas. More detailed results are presented
in Section 6.1.
5. CLOUD ASSURANCE
Progress in cloud security research fostered the development of assurance techniques
rising the confidence of the users that a cloud stack and its services comply with their
non-functional requirements. As discussed in the introduction, assurance is a much
wider notion than the one of security, unanimously defined by many sources2 as “the
protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, dis-
closure, disruption, modification, or destruction”. Indeed, in the cloud, it is perfectly
possible to have good security and poor assurance, as for instance when the operation
of sound security mechanisms is not made visible to the users. Many times, however,
poor assurance goes hand in hand with poor security. More importantly, poor assur-
ance usually prevents proving that security and privacy properties of a process comply
with laws and regulations.
The concept of transparency, that is, higher access to low-level (back-end) data pro-
duced by the cloud infrastructure and to evidence collected on the security of cloud
data and applications, has been recognized as the basis for an effective approach to
2See for instance SP 800-37; SP 800-53; SP 800-53A; SP 800-18; SP 800- 60; CNSSI-4009; FIPS 200; FIPS
199; 44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542.
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Table III. Cloud assurance solution classification on the basis of implemented assurance techniques
Assurance technique References
Testing [Bai et al. 2011][Bai et al. 2013][Candea et al. 2010][Chan et al. 2009][Ciortea et al. 2010][Gao et al. 2011][Gao et al. 2013]
[Hanawa et al. 2010][Jayasinghe et al. 2012][King and Ganti 2010][Koeppe and Schneider 2010][Lu et al. 2014][Mahmood et al. 2012]
[Moreno 2010][Parveen and Tilley 2010][Pham et al. 2011][Riungu et al. 2010][Starov and Vilkomir 2013][Tsai et al. 2011]
[Yu et al. 2010a][Zech 2011]
Monitoring [Aceto et al. 2013][Alhamazani et al. 2013][Foster and Spanoudakis 2011a][Foster and Spanoudakis 2011b][Ganglia 2014]
[Kai et al. 2013][Meng and Liu 2013][Massie et al. 2012][Mohamaddiah et al. 2014][Monfared and Jaatun 2011][Nagios 2014]
[Rao et al. 2013][Shao et al. 2010][Sundareswaran et al. 2012][Wang et al. 2010][Zou et al. 2013]
Certification [Bertholon et al. 2011][Cimato et al. 2013][Grobauer et al. 2011][Khan and Malluhi 2010][Krotsiani et al. 2013]
[Mun˜oz and Man˜a 2013][Spanoudakis et al. 2012][Sunyaev and Schneider 2013]
Audit/compliance [Birnbaum et al. 2013][CSA 2014][Doelitzscher et al. 2012][Doelitzscher et al. 2013][Doelitzscher et al. 2013][Haeberlen 2010]
[Mei et al. 2013][Ni et al. 2014][Pearson 2011][Rajkumar et al. 2013][Rasheed 2013][Shetty 2013][Wang et al. 2011][Wang et al. 2014]
[Wang et al. 2010][Wang et al. 2013b][Wang et al. 2013][Wang et al. 2012][Yang and Jia 2013][Zawoad et al. 2013][Zhu et al. 2013]
SLA [Anisetti et al. 2014][Bernsmed et al. 2011][Casalicchio and Silvestri 2013][CIO 2012][Garg et al. 2013][Jhawar and Piuri 2013]
[Jin et al. 2013][Marinescu et al. 2013][Mouratidis et al. 2013][Sakr and Liu 2012][Sulistio and Reich 2013][Wieder et al. 2011]
[Ye et al. 2012][Zhao et al. 2012]
cloud assurance [Ardagna et al. 2014; Spanoudakis et al. 2012]. Lack of transparency
in fact makes the cloud and its security issues not clear to end-users. Chauhan et
al. [Chauhan et al. 2013] claim that security threats “require cloud customer to look
for more transparency and controls” and that “SLAs and contracts do not provide tech-
nical and measurable method to find the security control status of cloud hosted ap-
plication/data”. They present an approach supporting the measurement of the secu-
rity status of a system. In particular, they propose a Security Measurement System
(SMS) that interacts with cloud-hosted applications to retrieve metric information.
Jenkins [Jenkins 2013] claims that there are three fundamental aspects to consider for
securing businesses moving to the cloud. Firstly, there is the need of a solution to risk
assessment and management, evaluating the impact a movement to the cloud would
have on the business. The second aspect is transparency, meaning that the cloud cus-
tomers must be well aware of cloud provider practices. Thirdly, policy and compliance
become a must. Cloud providers, following the transparency requirement, should not
only show their compliance to standards/regulations and the supported policies, but
also explain how they achieve and maintain their compliance levels under the “comply-
or-explain” principle [MacNeil and Li 2006]. In [Knode 2009], the concept of trans-
parency is introduced as a way to document, evaluate, and observe “technical controls
(e.g., auditing, access control, system configuration, encryption), management controls
(e.g., vulnerability assessments, risk assessments, system and service acquisition), and
operational controls (e.g., configuration management, awareness and training, change
management)”. Also, transparency aims to provide a trusted cloud service, which eval-
uates cloud providers and their trustworthiness. In this context, CloudTrust Protocol
(CTP) is the mechanism under the user control allowing it to ask and retrieve informa-
tion about the cloud provider infrastructure. In addition, according to [Ardagna et al.
2014], transparency is fundamental to support both introspection, that is, the capabil-
ity of a cloud provider of examining and observing its internal processes, and outro-
spection, that is, the ability of customers and service providers to examine and observe
cloud’s internal processes, involving their activities, data, and applications, for security
purposes. A proper solution to assurance in the cloud should embrace both introspec-
tion by cloud providers and outrospection by cloud customers (tenants in general), and
therefore balance the burden of security processes and controls between providers and
customers.
In this section, we survey approaches to the verification and validation of cloud
infrastructures. Cloud assurance approaches have been categorized according to the
classification of assurance techniques in Section 2.2: testing, monitoring, certification,
audit/compliance, SLA. These categories of solutions focus on increasing trust in the
cloud infrastructure, can target all levels of the cloud stack, and aim to empower cloud
users. Table III shows our classification of cloud assurance solutions based on the im-
plemented assurance techniques.
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5.1. Testing
The first class of approaches to software and service validation and verification is based
on testing. According to ISTQB glossary [van Veenendaal 2012], testing is “the process
consisting of all lifecycle activities, both static and dynamic, concerned with planning,
preparation and evaluation of software products and related work products to deter-
mine that they satisfy specified requirements, to demonstrate that they are fit for pur-
pose and to detect defects.”. Test-based approaches can be applied at all layers of the
cloud stack and can be used to give the assurance that a certain property is held by a
given cloud service/functionality [Riungu et al. 2010]. Usually, techniques for testing in
the cloud can be grouped in two main categories: solutions for testing the cloud infras-
tructure and solutions using cloud resources to test any kind of software applications
(including cloud services).
Chan et al. [Chan et al. 2009] present a modeling of the cloud as a graph and a set of
model-based testing criteria. Moreno [Moreno 2010] describes a solution to the testing
and benchmarking of cloud storage systems. He defines and implements a distributed
testing framework, which produces different amounts of load, performs simple put/get
operations, logs events and activities from the cloud storage system, and interacts with
the cloud and its behavior. The framework also produces statistics which are used to
outline system behavior and results of the testing activities. King and Ganti [King and
Ganti 2010] introduce the first solution to move autonomic self-testing to the cloud.
They combine an automated test script for cloud services with a Test Support as-a-
Service (TSaaS), providing partial automation of testing activities of remote cloud ser-
vices. Tsai et al. [Tsai et al. 2011] present a testing approach for service compositions
in the cloud. Their solution is based on group testing to identify an oracle, which is
then used to continuously test new services or compositions. Zech [Zech 2011] presents
a model-driven methodology for cloud security testing, where tests are generated ac-
cording to negative requirements that, in turn, are the outcome of risk analysis. Pham
et al. [Pham et al. 2011] describe CloudVal, a software-implemented fault injection
framework automating fault injection-based experiments. CloudVal supports reliabil-
ity verification and black box testing in virtualized environments. Bai et al. [Bai et al.
2011] survey existing cloud testing tools. They consider different approaches to cloud
testing such as traditional tools moved to the cloud, research and commercial tools,
and specific benchmarks and testbeds. However, they do not focus specifically on cloud
security. In a different survey, Gao et al. [Gao et al. 2011] provide a literature review on
cloud testing and cloud-based application testing. They present a summary of issues,
challenges, and problems, compare web-based software testing vs cloud-based applica-
tion testing, and describe existing commercial products and solutions for cloud testing.
Later, Gao et al. continued their work analyzing issues and challenges of SaaS test-
ing [Gao et al. 2013]. Recently, Lu et al. [Lu et al. 2014] proposed a solution to service
composition with global trust based on i) random assessments for objective Quality
of Service (QoS) such as execution time, reliability, availability, throughput, and ii)
client/service provider trust evaluation for subjective QoS.
Another line of research uses the cloud as a platform for application testing. Parveen
and Tilley [Parveen and Tilley 2010] present a general discussion to establish when it
is worth to move software testing to the cloud. Their evaluation considers the peculiar-
ities of the application under evaluation and the testing activities to be performed on
it. Working on a specific solution, Ciortea et al. [Ciortea et al. 2010] present Cloud9, an
on-demand testing service that runs in the cloud. Cloud9 provides fast, complete, and
automated testing of real software by means of parallel symbolic execution. Hanawa
et al. [Hanawa et al. 2010] present a testing environment, called D-Cloud, that can be
deployed in the cloud. D-Cloud is designed for dependable parallel and distributed sys-
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tems. Their solution tries to address the problem of testing information systems, which
are increasingly complex and distributed. Candea et al. [Candea et al. 2010] introduce
the notion of Testing-as-a-Service (TaaS). They present a cloud-based application im-
plementing a TaaS-automated software testing solution in three versions: i) “program-
mer’s sidekick” providing developers with an environment to test their application
code with little investment of resources, ii) “home edition” providing a testing service
that supports customers in testing the software they are ready to install on local PCs
or mobile devices, and iii) public “certification service” assessing software reliability,
safety, and security. To support TaaS efficiently, Yu et al. [Yu et al. 2010a] present
a solution that defines scheduling and dispatching algorithms to increase cloud com-
puting resource utilization. In different approaches, Koeppe and Schneider [Koeppe
and Schneider 2010] and Jayasinghe et al. [Jayasinghe et al. 2012] introduce solu-
tions focusing on testing the performance of cloud services. Mahmood et al. [Mahmood
et al. 2012] rely on the cloud to automatically test the security and robustness of An-
droid apps in a scalable way. Recently, Starov and Vilkomir [Starov and Vilkomir 2013]
presented Cloud Testing of Mobile Systems (CTOMS), an integrated TaaS solution of
mobile systems with a core infrastructure that enables the scaling of additional func-
tionalities, while Bai et al. [Bai et al. 2013] introduced the design and implementation
of Vee@Cloud, a platform-independent virtual test lab to provide on-demand testing
services and Internet-scale testing capabilities.
5.2. Monitoring
In addition to approaches for software testing in the cloud, much effort has been done
on cloud software and service monitoring. In fact, cloud gives limited access to infor-
mation about the status of services, as well as on events and activities happening in its
back-end. Monitoring can help to increase the level of transparency in the cloud, and in
turn the overall cloud security. Existing approaches to distributed system monitoring
support different kinds of monitoring, ranging from monitoring of individual software
services (e.g., [Mahbub and Spanoudakis 2004; Bianculli and Ghezzi 2007]), to ser-
vice compositions, workflows, or orchestrations (e.g., [Baresi and Guinea 2005; Moser
et al. 2008; Dranidis et al. 2009; Halle´ and Villemaire 2009; Simmonds et al. 2009]),
infrastructures for service-based systems (e.g., grid and cloud systems [Truong c and
Fahringer 2004; Andreozzi et al. 2005; Clayman et al. 2010; Ganglia 2014; Nagios
2014]), SLAs (e.g., [Ghezzi and Guinea 2007; Mahbub and Spanoudakis 2007]), or the
context of service-based systems (e.g., [Salifu et al. 2007; Kang et al. 2008]).
Focusing on cloud environments, several general-purpose monitoring solutions can
be used for cloud security monitoring. Ganglia [Massie et al. 2004; Massie et al. 2012;
Ganglia 2014] and Nagios [Nagios 2014] are two widespread open source distributed
monitoring systems. Ganglia [Ganglia 2014] supports performance monitoring of clus-
ters and grids; Nagios [Nagios 2014] defines a general purpose toolkit for monitoring
diverse IT infrastructure assets, including applications, network protocol drivers, op-
erating systems, and other software components. Shao et al. [Shao et al. 2010] propose
a Runtime Model for CloudMonitoring (RMCM). RMCM collects raw data from several
monitoring probes and presents them in a more intuitive form. The proposed approach
finds a balance between monitoring overhead and capability, by managing monitor-
ing facilities in an adaptive fashion. Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2010] define a monitor-
ing approach that fits cloud complexity. They propose a scalable solution to perform
analysis and correlation of logs for cloud hardware and software components. Their
work extends the Run-Time Correlation Engine (RTCE) [Holub et al. 2009] to pro-
vide a scalable approach for the cloud. The SLA@SOI project developed a dynamically
configurable monitoring infrastructure [Foster and Spanoudakis 2011a; 2011b]. The
proposed infrastructure can automatically adapt to changes in the monitoring func-
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tionalities available to service-based systems, and control and monitor SLAs, including
agreements on security properties. Monfared and Jaatun [Monfared and Jaatun 2011]
provide an overview of existing security monitoring mechanisms and how they can be
adapted to the cloud. They analyze new issues, challenges, and requirements when
moving monitoring functionalities to the cloud and propose approaches to mitigate
them. Sundareswaran et al. [Sundareswaran et al. 2012] introduce a cloud informa-
tion accountability framework that keeps track of user data usage in the cloud. Their
approach integrates automatic data access logging and an auditing mechanism, and
supports strong back-end protection. Zou et al. [Zou et al. 2013] present a trusted
monitoring framework for virtualized cloud platforms. Their approach is based on
an independent guest domain for monitoring and on trusted computing to guaran-
tee framework integrity, and addresses the trust challenges between cloud providers
and their tenants. Rao et al. [Rao et al. 2013] develop previous work on fuzzy service
selection [Bosc et al. 2001] to propose DynaQoS, a self-tuning fuzzy control framework
that includes “mechanisms for self-tuning output amplification and flexible rule selec-
tion”. DynaQoS [Rao et al. 2013] supports “adaptive multi-objective resource allocation
and service differentiation”. Alhamazani et al. [Alhamazani et al. 2013] identify and
discuss the major design issues related to engineering cloud monitoring tools, while
Kai et al. [Kai et al. 2013] present the design of SCM, a monitoring system work-
ing within Apache CloudStack platform, and its main components. Aceto et al. [Aceto
et al. 2013] provide a survey on cloud monitoring. The survey focuses on platforms,
mechanisms, and products for cloud infrastructure, service, and application monitor-
ing. Meng and Liu [Meng and Liu 2013] discuss the idea of Monitoring-as-a-Service
(MaaS), and present the major components and key functional requirements of MaaS
in the cloud. Mohamaddiah et al. [Mohamaddiah et al. 2014] also introduce a survey
on cloud monitoring, while the main focus is on resource allocation and management.
5.3. Certification
The use of certification techniques to provide enough evidence that a software system
holds some non-functional properties and behaves correctly has become widespread in
the last twenty years and is also becoming important in cloud environments. Many
certification solutions and schemes have been proposed in the past. A survey of certifi-
cation schemes used to evaluate and certify security properties of software in general,
and of security controls in particular, can be found in [Damiani et al. 2009a]. How-
ever, as pointed out in [Anisetti et al. 2013b], “existing certification techniques are not
well-suited to the service scenario”, and in turn to the cloud scenario. In fact, such tech-
niques “usually consider static and monolithic software, provide certificates in the form
of human-readable statements, and consider system-wide certificates to be used at de-
ployment and installation time”. By contrast, in a cloud environment, a certification
scheme needs to accomplish the dynamic, multi-level, and hybrid nature of clouds. In
addition, it must integrate with cloud-specific runtime processes, involving service de-
ployment, discovery, selection, and composition, and management activities, including
migration, elasticity, and resource allocation.
The first step towards cloud certification consists in the definition of certification
solutions for services. Damiani et al. [Damiani et al. 2009b] study the issue of assess-
ing and certifying SOA operation, by means of security certificates including signed
test cases. Also, the US-based Software Engineering Institute (SEI) [SEI 2011] de-
fines a certification and accreditation process for services following requirements by
the US Army CIO/G-6. Kourtesis et al. [Kourtesis et al. 2010] use Stream X-machines
to increase SOA reliability. Their solution manages conformance testing via the SOA
registry, which evaluates functional equivalence between a service and its specifica-
tions. If equivalence is verified, a certificate is awarded to the service. Furthermore,
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some papers (e.g., [Ryu et al. 2008; Papazoglou et al. 2011]) analyze the management
of evolving services subject to dynamic changes. This scenario, which introduces the
need of continuous service re-design, has direct impact on cloud/service security cer-
tification. Changes may in fact invalidate certificates, thus requiring re-certification.
Anisetti et al. [Anisetti et al. 2012; 2013a; Anisetti et al. 2013b] propose a security
certification scheme that implements a model-based testing approach, and extends it
to cope with certification of evolving services and service compositions. The proposed
solution relies on a Symbolic Transition System (STS)-based service modeling to the
aim of automatically generating test cases for service certification.
Focusing on cloud computing, only a few preliminary solutions to the cloud certi-
fication problem have been proposed. Khan and Malluhi [Khan and Malluhi 2010]
discuss the problem of establishing trust between the cloud and its customers, and
describe possible approaches to support trust in the cloud, including service certifi-
cation. From a different point of view, Grobauer et al. [Grobauer et al. 2011] provide
an overview of current vulnerabilities affecting the cloud at different levels, and iden-
tify certification as a preferred approach for vulnerability management. Spanoudakis
et al. [Spanoudakis et al. 2012] discuss the need of providing novel models for cloud
service certification and present a hybrid, incremental, and multi-layer approach to
cloud certification. Sunyaev and Schneider [Sunyaev and Schneider 2013] present an
overview of the possible benefits a certification solution for cloud services could give to
all cloud actors, addressing the lack of transparency, trust, and acceptance. Bertholon
et al. [Bertholon et al. 2011] present CERTICLOUD, a solution that builds on a trusted
platform module to protect and verify the integrity of IaaS providers. CERTICLOUD
is based on two protocols: i) TPM-based Certification of a Remote Resource (TCRR)
verifies the integrity of physical resources, ii) VerifyMyVM verifies the integrity of
the environment of the user when deployed in the cloud. Mun˜oz and Man˜a [Mun˜oz
and Man˜a 2013] introduce a solution to security certification in the cloud that com-
bines software and hardware-based certification. The proposed approach is based on
trusted computing technology, and aims to bridge the gap between cloud certification
and trusted computing. Krotsiani et al. [Krotsiani et al. 2013] propose an approach
to the incremental certification of cloud services. The proposed approach targets all
layers of the cloud stack and is based on continuous monitoring. Cimato et al. [Cimato
et al. 2013] introduce a conceptual framework supporting the specification of basic, hy-
brid, and incremental models for the certification of cloud-based services. In particular,
they define a meta-model supporting the management of the whole certification pro-
cess: from security property definition, to evidence generation and certificate lifecycle
management.
5.4. Cloud Audit/Compliance
Another important aspect of cloud assurance is the capability of observing the cloud
behavior and evaluating its compliance with customer policies and law regulations. In
other words this goal can be expressed with the slogan “making the cloud auditable”.
Audit solutions can increase the transparency of the cloud, thus increasing the level of
trustworthiness between the cloud itself and its tenants. Specifically, Haeberlen [Hae-
berlen 2010] and Paerson [Pearson 2011] respectively claim the need of an account-
able cloud, which helps to increase users’ trust, and supports both providers and cus-
tomers in the identification of responsibilities in case of disputes and problems. Later,
Rasheed [Rasheed 2013] provided an overview of the state of the art in cloud auditing,
focusing on i) user requirements, ii) techniques for security auditing, and iii) capabili-
ties of cloud service providers to address audit requirements.
Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2013b] use a homomorphic authenticator
with randommasking to provide an auditing system for the cloud with privacy in mind.
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Mei et al. [Mei et al. 2013] present TTP-ACE, a trusted third party-based auditing
system for the cloud. TTP-ACE is aimed at increasing accountability of cloud service
providers and protecting the cloud users. A number of public auditing solutions that do
not rely on a TTP have become available. In a seminal paper, Wang et al. [Wang et al.
2011] propose a system supporting integrity verification and addressing the dynamic
evolution of data files. Then, Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2012] introduce an integrity au-
diting mechanism that relies on distributed erasure-coded data. A priori encoding of
data permits users to audit a cloud storage at low computation and communication
costs. After that, Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2013] designed a complete public auditing
mechanism for the cloud. Their approach guarantees shared data integrity as well as
efficient revocation of users using proxy re-signatures. Public verifiers are then capa-
ble of auditing data integrity with no need to retrieve the entire data from the cloud.
Recently, Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2014] proposed an approach to privacy-preserving
public auditing, which supports integrity verification of shared data in the cloud. The
proposed solution is based on a ring signature that protects the identity of the signers
from public auditors, and allows integrity verification without requiring the disclosure
of the entire file. Birnbaum et al. [Birnbaum et al. 2013] introduce a new behavioral
modeling scheme to audit VM behaviors and detect suspicious processes. The proposed
cloud security auditing solution has been evaluated on a private cloud computing plat-
form. Rajkumar et al. [Rajkumar et al. 2013] describe an efficient auditing approach
based on raptor codes that provides data integrity in the cloud. The same approach also
supports functionalities for recovering data in case of failures. Shetty [Shetty 2013]
considers the analysis of network traffic as a fundamental aspect of cloud auditing to
the aim of verifying security of data exchanged between a cloud provider and users.
The proposed approach is based on IP geolocation of network devices, monitoring data
security in the network, and analysis of large cloud auditing logs. Yang and Jia [Yang
and Jia 2013] define an auditing framework for cloud storage, which ensures that data
have been saved following agreements with data owners. They also provide a secure
and privacy-preserving auditing protocol, with no trusted parties, which supports dy-
namic operations and batch auditing. Ni et al. [Ni et al. 2014] show that the auditing
protocol in [Yang and Jia 2013] is insecure against active adversaries in the cloud,
and that adversaries can modify cloud data without being detected. They also pro-
pose a solution to solve the problem, preserving all properties of the original protocol.
Doelitzscher et al. [Doelitzscher et al. 2012; Doelitzscher et al. 2013] propose Security
Audit as a Service (SAaaS), a cloud audit and incident detection system. Their goal is
to present a solution that i) addresses the limitations of traditional audit and intrusion
detection systems whenmoved to the cloud and ii) reacts to changes in the cloud infras-
tructure. SAaaS is aimed at increasing transparency of cloud by giving customers ac-
cess to data about security incidents. In a later development [Doelitzscher et al. 2013],
the authors presented a cloud audit policy language for the SAaaS architecture, which
aims to enrich SAaaS towards the definition of a complete audit system. The presented
approach mostly targets IaaS level, is focused on security monitoring, and is aimed at
presenting auditing data through a standard interface. Zhu et al. [Zhu et al. 2013]
propose a dynamic audit service relying on an index-hash table that supports provable
updates to outsourced data. Dynamic auditing guarantees timely anomaly detection.
Zawoad et al. [Zawoad et al. 2013] present Secure-Logging-as-a-Service (SecLaaS), a
logging system that provides VM logs to forensic investigators preserving privacy and
confidentiality of cloud users. Also, SecLaaS preserves log integrity from dishonest
investigators or cloud providers. Recently, Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) started an
effort called CloudAudit [CSA 2014], which focuses on the provisioning of a common
interface and namespace supporting enterprises in the management of their internal
audit processes.
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5.5. Service Level Agreement (SLA)
Another class of assurance techniques is based on Service Level Agreements (SLAs).
SLA-based techniques aim to establish contracts between clients and service providers
regulating their interactions, and modeling their expectations in terms of both func-
tional and non-functional agreements. Wieder et al. [Wieder et al. 2011] provide an
overview of the usage of SLAs in the cloud and service-oriented architectures. Existing
techniques mainly focus on SLAmanagement and negotiation (e.g., [Wieder et al. 2011;
Bernsmed et al. 2011; Sakr and Liu 2012; CIO 2012; Jhawar and Piuri 2013]) and ap-
proaches to service selection based on QoS and non-functional properties (e.g., [Zhao
et al. 2012; Garg et al. 2013; Mouratidis et al. 2013]). In a whitepaper [CIO 2012], the
CIO Council and the Chief Acquisition Officers Council discuss guidelines for setting
up cloud computing contracts that can be effectively consumed in a federal government
scenario. The paper also describes requirements on cloud computing contracts, based
on the input provided by different working groups, allowing US agencies to effectively
and safely select and consume cloud services.
Several frameworks have been proposed for cloud SLAs. Bernsmed et al. [Bernsmed
et al. 2011] present a framework for the management of security SLAs in the cloud, fo-
cusing on hybrid clouds and federated cloud services. The framework aims to support
service composition based on security requirements and increase cloud trustworthi-
ness. The paper also specifies the SLA lifecycle and the negotiation flow. Sakr and
Liu [Sakr and Liu 2012] present a middleware-based framework to SLA-based provi-
sioning in the context of cloud-hosted databases. The proposed framework supports dy-
namic provisioning of the data layer, and relies on application-specific policies match-
ing customer’s performance requirements defined with SLAs. Ye et al. [Ye et al. 2012]
propose a framework based on a third party auditor for the verification of SLAs be-
tween users and cloud service providers. A testing algorithm within the framework
has been designed to detect SLA violations on VM physical memory size. As QoS is an
important part of SLA, Garg et al. [Garg et al. 2013] propose the Service Measurement
Index Cloud (SMICloud) framework that supports cloud users in the identification
of the most suitable cloud provider and in the management of SLAs. SMICloud im-
plements different functionalities including QoS-based selection and ranking of cloud
services according to their quality, previous user experiences, and performance. SMI-
Cloud can foster competition among service providers increasing the quality of cloud
services. Zhao et al. [Zhao et al. 2012] propose an architecture for QoS-based service
selection in SOAs and cloud. The proposed solution is flexible, scalable, and supports
multiple objectives and user personalization. Marinescu et al. [Marinescu et al. 2013]
provide a novel cloud delivery model based on combinatorial auctions supporting a
better management of QoS and security, while Casalicchio and Silvestri [Casalicchio
and Silvestri 2013] analyze the problem of self-adaptable solutions to cloud resource
management that react to workload changes and new utility principles. The authors
put forward the example of a service supplier moving services to the cloud in order
to benefit from a scalable provisioning that addresses QoS constraints. Instead of fo-
cusing on QoS in general, Jin et al. [Jin et al. 2013] describe a method to evaluate
availability in virtualized cloud systems and guarantee agreed SLAs. Jhawar and Pi-
uri [Jhawar and Piuri 2013] consider the problem of guaranteeing user availability and
performance requirements in the cloud. They propose an adaptive resource manage-
ment solution based on Markov chains and queues, which restores user requirements
in case of failure and recovery events. Other solutions include the work of Mouratidis
et al. [Mouratidis et al. 2013], the work of Sulistio and Reich [Sulistio and Reich 2013],
and the work of Anisetti et al. [Anisetti et al. 2014]. Mouratidis et al. [Mouratidis et al.
2013] present an advanced solution to the selection of cloud providers on the basis of
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
From Security to Assurance in the Cloud: A Survey :23
security and privacy requirements. Their paper proposes a modeling language and a
structured process for security- and privacy-aware selection of cloud providers. Sulis-
tio and Reich [Sulistio and Reich 2013] present a solution supporting small-medium
enterprises in their migration to the cloud. The service migration approach is based on
pre-defined SLA templates and risk analysis. It also provides a self-protecting cloud
service that monitors privacy issues and protection mechanisms. Recently, Anisetti et
al. [Anisetti et al. 2014] defined a solution for multi-cloud service provisioning. Their
approach models service provisioning as procurement e-auctions, where a preference
relation maps on a partial order of bids. The e-auction mechanism at the basis of the
service selection process supports trustworthy bids and improves the truthfulness of
the e-auction outcome.
5.6. Discussion
This section surveyed a number of research works aimed to increase the assurance
provided to actors at all layers of the cloud stack, evaluating whether a service/cloud
stack complies with actors’ functional and non-functional requirements. In particular,
we presented a set of papers whose main goal is to increase cloud assurance on the
security mechanisms and controls discussed in Section 4.
Table III presents our main findings. First of all, we note that since assurance tech-
niques are relatively more recent than security techniques, it is difficult to catego-
rize them according to the security properties they target. In fact, current approaches
mainly focus on providing general-purpose assurance techniques rather than focusing
on specific security aspects. As a consequence, Table III only lists relevant papers ac-
cording to the classification of assurance techniques in Section 2.2. Furthermore, we
note that testing, monitoring, and SLA solutions were obtained by adapting existing
solutions to the cloud environment. Indeed, testing approaches have focused on testing
cloud-based applications and on a testing-as-a-service approach, where a testing tool is
deployed in the cloud and used to verify any software/service. Monitoring approaches,
instead, focused on requirements for the deployment of a monitoring infrastructure in
the cloud. Approaches based on SLA have focused on SLA-aware cloud provisioning,
with the aim of supporting QoS-based service selection. Finally, some approaches have
started considering the problem of verifying properties of cloud services/stacks using
certification-based approaches (a priori) or auditing solutions (a posteriori).
6. DISCUSSION
Reviewed contributions varied in type, covered various aspects of cloud security and
assurance, and have been selected according to the methodology described in Section 2.
Now we present the results of our survey (Section 6.1) and some recommendations for
next generation security solutions in the cloud (Section 6.2).
6.1. Cloud security and assurance: Overview of the results
We surveyed a total of 306 works (including the ones in the appendices) among which
31 present surveys and whitepapers, 21 describe standards and research projects, 161
illustrate research papers focusing on specific aspects of security and assurance in the
cloud, and the remaining are papers considering either general aspects of cloud en-
vironments and distributed systems, or security vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks.
We then focused our study on the 161 research papers analyzing the status of the re-
search in the field of cloud security and assurance. A more detailed summary of the 161
research papers according to the methodology in Section 2 is provided in Appendix B.
Figure 2 presents an overview of the status of cloud security and assurance on the
basis of the surveyed papers. Figure 2(a) presents the distribution of papers in the
period 2009 and 2014, distinguishing between security and assurance approaches. To
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Fig. 2. Security and assurance techniques distribution in period 2009-2014
correctly evaluate the distribution of papers in Figure 2(a), we recall that in this survey
we favored recent papers (after 2012). Taking into consideration the last 3-year period,
we can observe that the growth in the number of assurance-oriented papers between
2012 and 2013 is much higher (from 13% to 42% of the total number of solutions in the
period 2009-2014) than the growth in the number of security-oriented papers (from
23% to 36%). This is more evident if we consider absolute numbers: we analyzed 11
assurance-oriented papers in 2012 and 36 papers in 2013, while we studied 21 secu-
rity oriented papers in 2012 and 33 in 2013. Finally, it is important to note that the
number of papers analyzed in 2013 and 2014 distributes almost equally between se-
curity and assurance techniques, showing that assurance is increasingly considered
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by the research community as an important aspect, and is becoming as important as
security in the cloud.
Figure 2(b) shows the trend of security and assurance techniques with respect to the
attack surface. First of all, we note that more work has been done on solutions consid-
ering application-level (34.9%) and tenant-on-tenant (35.6%) attack surfaces, while
less work is available on provider-on-tenant and tenant-on-provider attack surface
(29.5%). This is due to the fact that application-level solutions often are straightfor-
ward evolutions of approaches defined for service-oriented architectures, while tenant-
on-tenant attacks have been modeled since long. These data are even more clear if we
consider that i)more than 50% of the work focusing on provider-on-tenant and tenant-
on-provider also considers the other two attack surfaces and ii)more than 78% focuses
on at least one of the other two surfaces. Also, we note that the number of defined
solutions is increasing for all attack surface categories with similar trends.
Figure 2(c) shows that, as expected, existing techniques put more effort on preserv-
ing/protecting confidentiality (28.3%) and integrity (24.3%) properties, while less effort
has been done on availability (14%), authenticity (15.4%), and privacy (18%). These re-
sults confirm the importance of guaranteeing confidentiality and integrity of user data
and applications when moved to the cloud, but also the need of additional research
on identity management solutions operating across clouds. We also note that the rela-
tively low number of solutions targeting availability is due to the fact that availability
is often seen as a property at the border between the security, reliability, and per-
formance research areas. In addition, Figure 2(c) shows that the number of defined
solutions is increasing for all security properties with similar trends.
Figure 2(d) show that encryption (37.2%) and access control (23.9%) are the pre-
ferred classes of techniques for implementing cloud security approaches. The above
classes are completed (and more often integrated) with approaches relying on digital
signature (7.1%) and authentication (11.5%), respectively. Less work instead has been
done on IDS/IPS (10.6%) and trusted computing (9.7%), because both techniques have
been proposed only recently for virtual environments. Furthermore, it is rather com-
plex to employ trusted computing since it requires the support of special hardware
devices and its deployment cost is high. The same remark can be done on IDS/IPS that
when moved to the cloud introduce higher management and configuration overheads.
Considering cloud security assurance, the distribution of techniques in the classes de-
fined in Section 2.2 is broken in two sets. The first one includes audit, monitoring, and
testing approaches having the greatest percentage of implemented techniques (25.9%,
25.9%, 23.5%, resp.). The second one includes SLA and certification having the lowest
rate (13.6% and 11.1%, resp.). The success of auditing, monitoring, and testing classes
is due to the fact that their techniques are often used to verify functionalities of dis-
tributed infrastructures and can then be easily applied to a cloud environment. Also,
very often the cloud infrastructure has been used to deliver monitoring and testing
functionalities as a service. By contrast, SLA and certification approaches have been
applied to service environments only recently and therefore are still only occasionally
used in cloud infrastructures.
Finally, Figure 2(e) gives an overview of how different techniques distribute among
targeted properties. If we consider security techniques, 34.8% target confidentiality
property (highest), while only 8% target availability property (lowest). The remaining
techniques almost equally target integrity, authenticity, and privacy properties (be-
tween 17.9% and 21%). If we consider assurance techniques, their distribution is more
homogeneous among classes of properties, probably because they have been applied to
cloud environments only recently: 29.8% for integrity (highest) and 15.8% for privacy
(lowest).
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6.2. Recommendations for next-generation cloud security and assurance
Widespread adoption of cloud computing requires security and assurance solutions in-
creasing the trust of cloud users in the cloud itself and in cloud providers. The problem
of enforcing and verifying security is exacerbated by the fact that the cloud provides
many functionalities increasing flexibility, performance, and reliability (e.g., migra-
tion, federation, scalability, elasticity), which affect the functioning of security and
assurance solutions for distributed networks.
Many researchers have proposed fine-grained security solutions that target differ-
ent angles of the cloud security problem. Although such solutions might help expert
users to secure their applications and data in the cloud, they make the cloud security
scenario cumbersome for the majority of customers.
According to [Ardagna et al. 2014], we claim that introspection, which is the capa-
bility of a cloud provider of examining and observing its internal processes, is not the
only concept that matters when considering cloud security. In fact, the concept of out-
rospection, that is, empowering customers and service providers with the ability to
examine and observe cloud’s internal processes impacting on (the security of) their ac-
tivities/applications/data, is also of paramount importance. A proper solution to secu-
rity in the cloud should embrace both introspection by cloud providers and outrospec-
tion by cloud customers (tenants in general), balancing security and assurance control
between providers and customers, and fostering full adoption of the cloud paradigm
also in critical environments. We claim that an increased cloud transparency can help
the security management problem, supporting both introspection and outrospection.
Transparency can be achieved via standardized interfaces, independent from the cloud
stack, which give a common access point to events and activities happening in the cloud
back-end. For instance, support for a given security property can be proven, monitored,
and tested by collecting data on the functioning of a given security mechanism (e.g., an
access control mechanism for authorization). By collecting uniform and homogeneous
data on cloud activities, we can also enrich solutions evaluating cloud compliance and
audit, as well as approaches supporting dynamic adaptation of the cloud infrastructure
to changes that would affect both the cloud provider (and its management activities)
and the customer (and the corresponding services). Also, standardized access to these
data can give to the customers some evidence on the current status of their services
and overall security, and support the management of their security (and more in gen-
eral non-functional) property life-cycle.
Cloud back-end data represent a hidden treasure over which one can build new ser-
vices, and improve cloud functionality, security, and assurance.
REFERENCES
G. Aceto, A. Botta, W. De Donato, and A. Pescape`. 2013. Cloud Monitoring: A Survey. Computer Networks
57, 9 (June 2013), 2093–2115.
Advanced Security Service cERTificate for SOA 2010. Advanced Security Service cERTificate for SOA. http:
//assert4soa.eu/.
E. Aguiar, Y. Zhang, and M. Blanton. 2013. An Overview of Issues and Recent Developments in Cloud
Computing and Storage Security. In High Performance Semantic Cloud Auditing, B.-Y. Choi, K. Han,
and S. Song (Eds.). Springer.
M. Ahmed, Q.H. Vu, R. Asal, H. Al Muhairi, and C.Y. Yeun. July 2012. SECRESO: a Secure Storage Model
for Cloud Data based on Reed-Solomon Code. In Proc. of AIM 2012. Jeju, South Korea.
M. Al Morsy, J. Grundy, and I. Mu¨ller. November-December 2010. An Analysis of The Cloud Computing
Security Problem. In Proc. of APSEC-CLOUD 2010. Sydney, Australia.
K. Alhamazani, R. Ranjan, K. Mitra, F. Rabhi, S.U. Khan, A. Guabtni, and V. Bhatnagar. 2013. An Overview
of the Commercial Cloud Monitoring Tools: Research Dimensions, Design Issues, and State-of-the-Art.
CoRR abs/1312.6170 (2013).
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
From Security to Assurance in the Cloud: A Survey :27
S.A. Almulla and C.Y. Yeun. March-April 2010. Cloud computing security management. In Proc. of ICESMA
2010. Sharjah, UAE.
S. Andreozzi, N. De Bortoli, S. Fantinel, A. Ghiselli, G. Rubini, G. Tortone, and M.C. Vistoli. 2005. GridICE: a
monitoring service for Grid systems. Future Generation Computer Systems 21, 4 (April 2005), 559–571.
Aniketos, ASSERT4SOA, CUMULUS, SecCord. 2013. Specifications identification & gap analysis Use cases
43, 78, 80. http://csc.etsi.org/Application/documentapp/downloadimmediate/?docId=123.
M. Anisetti, C.A. Ardagna, and E. Damiani. June 2012. A Low-Cost Security Certification Scheme for Evolv-
ing Services. In Proc. of IEEE ICWS 2012. Honolulu, HI, USA.
M. Anisetti, C.A. Ardagna, and E. Damiani. June-July 2013a. Security Certification of Composite Services:
A Test-Based Approach. In Proc. of IEEE ICWS 2013. San Francisco, CA, USA.
M. Anisetti, C.A. Ardagna, E. Damiani, P.A. Bonatti, M. Faella, C. Galdi, and L. Sauro. 2014. e-Auctions for
Multi-Cloud Service Provisioning. In Proc. of IEEE SCC 2014. Anchorage, AL, USA.
M. Anisetti, C.A. Ardagna, E. Damiani, and F. Saonara. 2013b. A Test-based Security Certification Scheme
for Web Services. ACM TWEB 7, 2 (May 2013), 1–41.
C.A. Ardagna, R. Asal, E. Damiani, and Q.H. Vu. March-April 2014. On the Management of Cloud Non-
Functional Properties: The Cloud Transparency Toolkit. In Proc. of IFIP NTMS 2014. Dubai, UAE.
C.A. Ardagna, E. Damiani, F. Frati, D. Rebeccani, and M. Ughetti. June 2012. Scalability Patterns for
Platform-as-a-Service. In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2012. Honolulu, HI, USA.
M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A.D. Joseph, R. Katz, A. Konwinski, G. Lee, D. Patterson, A. Rabkin, I.
Stoica, and M. Zaharia. 2009. Above the clouds: A Berkeley view of cloud computing. In Tech. Rep.
UCB/EECS-2009-28. EECS Department, U.C. Berkeley.
M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A.D. Joseph, R. Katz, A. Konwinski, G. Lee, D. Patterson, A. Rabkin, I.
Stoica, and M. Zaharia. 2010. A View of Cloud Computing. CACM 53, 4 (April 2010), 50–58.
W.W. Armour et al. 2013. NIST Cloud Computing Security Reference Architecture. NIST Special Publi-
cation 500-299, http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-cloud-computing/pub/CloudComputing/CloudSecurity/
NIST Security Reference Architecture 2013.05.15 v1.0.pdf.
V. Attasena, N. Harbi, and J. Darmont. September 2013. Sharing-based Privacy and Availability of Cloud
Data Warehouses. In Proc. of EDA 2013. Leuven, Belgium.
A. Aviram, S. Hu, B. Ford, and R. Gummadi. October 2010. Determinating Timing Channels in Compute
Clouds. In Proc. of ACM CCSW 2010. Chicago, IL, USA.
J. Bacon, D. Eyers, T. Pasquier, J. Singh, I. Papagiannis, and P. Pietzuch. 2014. Information Flow Control
for Secure Cloud Computing. IEEE TNSM (2014).
X. Bai, M. Li, B. Chen, W.-T. Tsai, and J. Gao. December 2011. Cloud testing tools. In Proc. of IEEE SOSE
2011. Irvine, CA, USA.
X. Bai, M. Li, X. Huang, W.-T. Tsai, and J. Gao. May 2013. Vee@Cloud: The virtual test lab on the cloud. In
Proc. of AST 2013. San Francisco, CA, USA.
G. Ballabio. 2013. Security and availability techniques for cloud-based applications. Computer Fraud &
Security 2013, 10 (October 2013), 5–7.
L. Baresi and S. Guinea. December 2005. Dynamo: Dynamic Monitoring of WS-BPEL Processes. In Proc. of
ICSOC 2005. Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
A. Barsoum and A. Hasan. 2013. Enabling Dynamic Data and Indirect Mutual Trust for Cloud Computing
Storage Systems. IEEE TPDS 24, 12 (December 2013), 2375–2385.
F. Benali, N. Bennani, G. Gianini, and S. Cimato. October 2010. A Distributed and Privacy-Preserving
Method for Network Intrusion Detection. In Proc. of OTM 2010. Hersonissos, Crete, Greece.
N. Bennani, E. Damiani, and S. Cimato. July 2010. Toward cloud-based key management for outsourced
databases. In Proc. of SAPSE 2010. Seoul, South Korea.
S. Berger, R. Ca´ceres, K.A. Goldman, R. Perez, R. Sailer, and L. van Doorn. July-August 2006. vTPM: Vir-
tualizing the Trusted Platform Module. In Proc. of USENIX-SS 2006. Vancouver, B.C., Canada.
K. Bernsmed, M.G. Jaatun, P.H. Meland, and A. Undheim. August 2011. Security SLAs for Federated Cloud
Services. In Proc. of ARES 2011. Prague, Cezch Republic.
K. Bernsmed, M.G. Jaatun, P.H. Meland, and A. Undheim. December 2012. Thunder in the Clouds: Security
challenges and solutions for federated Clouds. In Proc. of IEEE CloudCom 2012. Taipei, Taiwan.
B. Bertholon, S. Varrette, and P. Bouvry. July 2011. Certicloud: A Novel TPM-based Approach to Ensure
Cloud IaaS Security. In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2011. Washington, DC, USA.
R. Bhadauria and S. Sanyal. 2012. Survey on Security Issues in Cloud Computing and Associated Mitigation
Techniques. http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1204/1204.0764.pdf.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
:28 C.A. Ardagna et al.
D. Bianculli and C. Ghezzi. September 2007. Monitoring Conversational Web Services. In Proc. of IW-
SOSWE 2007. Dubrovnik, Croatia.
A. Birgisson, J.G. Politz, U. Erlingsson, A. Taly, M. Vrable, and M. Lentczner. February 2014. Macaroons:
Cookies with Contextual Caveats for Decentralized Authorization in the Cloud. In Proc. of NDSS 2014.
San Diego, CA, USA.
Z. Birnbaum, B. Liu, A. Dolgikh, Y. Chen, and V. Skormin. June-July 2013. Cloud Security Auditing Based
on Behavioral Modeling. In Proc. of IEEE SERVICES 2013. Santa Clara, CA, USA.
A. Bisong and S.M. Rahman. 2011. An Overview of the Security Concerns in Enterprise Cloud Computing.
CoRR abs/1101.5613 (2011). http://arxiv.org/abs/1101.5613.
S. Bleikertz, S. Bugiel, H. Ideler, S. Nu¨rnberger, and A.-R. Sadeghi. June 2013. Client-Controlled
Cryptography-as-a-Service in the Cloud. In Proc. of ACNS 2013. Banff, AB, Cananda.
S. Bleikertz, A. Kurmus, Z.A. Nagy, and M. Schunter. May 2012. Secure cloud maintenance: protecting
workloads against insider attacks. In Proc. of ACM ASIACCS 2012. Seoul, Korea.
P.A. Boampong and L.A. Wahsheh. March 2012. Different Facets of Security in the Cloud. In Proc. of CNS
2012. Orlando, FL, USA.
J.-M. Bohli, N. Gruschka, M. Jensen, L.L. Iacono, and N. Marnau. 2013. Security and Privacy-Enhancing
Multicloud Architectures. Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on 10, 4 (July-August
2013), 212–224.
G. Booth, A. Soknacki, and A. Somayaji. June 2013. Cloud Security: Attacks and Current Defenses. In Proc.
of ASIA 2013. Albany, NY, USA.
P. Bosc, E. Damiani, and M. Fugini. 2001. Fuzzy service selection in a distributed object-oriented environ-
ment. IEEE TFS 9, 5 (2001), 682–698.
S. Bouchenak, G. Chockler, H. Chockler, G. Gheorghe, N. Santos, and A. Shraer. 2013. Verifying Cloud
Services: Present and Future. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 47, 2 (July 2013), 6–19.
K.D. Bowers, A. Juels, and A. Oprea. November 2009. HAIL: A High-availability and Integrity Layer for
Cloud Storage. In Proc. of ACM CCS 2009. Chicago, IL, USA.
N. Brender and I. Markov. 2013. Risk perception and risk management in cloud computing: Results from a
case study of Swiss companies. IJIM 33, 5 (June 2013), 726–733.
J. Buckley, T. Mens, M. Zenger, A. Rashid, and G. Kniesel. 2005. Towards a Taxonomy of Software Change:
Research Articles. Journal of Software Maintenance and Evolution: Research and Practice - Unantici-
pated Software Evolution 17, 5 (September 2005), 309–332.
S. Bugiel, S. Nu¨rnberger, T. Po¨ppelmann, A.-R. Sadeghi, and T. Schneider. October 2011. AmazonIA: When
Elasticity Snaps Back. In Proc. of ACM CCS 2011. Chicago, IL, USA.
R.A. Burger, C. Cachin, and E. Husmann. 2013. Cloud, Trust, Privacy.
T. Caddy. 2011. Side-Channel Attacks. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, H.C.A. van Tilborg
and S. Jajodia (Eds.). Springer.
G. Candea, S. Bucur, and C. Zamfir. June 2010. Automated Software Testing As a Service. In Proc. of ACM
SoCC 2010. Indianapolis, IN, USA.
B. Carminati. 2009. Merkle Trees. In Encyclopedia of Database Systems, L. Liu, M.T. O¨zsu, and M. Tamer
(Eds.). Springer.
E. Casalicchio and L. Silvestri. 2013. Mechanisms for SLA Provisioning in Cloud-based Service Providers.
Computer Networks 57, 3 (February 2013), 795–810.
D. Catteddu and G. Hogben. November 2009a. Cloud Computing: Benefits, Risks and Recommendations
for Information Security. European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). http://
www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-management/files/deliverables/cloud-computing-risk-assessment/
at download/fullReport.
D. Catteddu and G. Hogben. November 2009b. Information Assurance Framework. European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA). .
CEN. 2014. CEN Workshop on Requirements and recommendations for assurance in the Cloud (WS RACS).
http://www.cen.eu/work/areas/ICT/eBusiness/Pages/WS-RACS.aspx.
Certification infrastrUcture for MUlti-layer cloUd Services 2013. Certification infrastrUcture for MUlti-layer
cloUd Services. http://www.cumulus-project.eu/.
Certification, InteRnationalisation and standaRdization in cloUd Security 2012. Certification, InteRnation-
alisation and standaRdization in cloUd Security. http://www.cirrus-project.eu/.
W.K. Chan, L. Mei, and Z. Zhang. December 2009. Modeling and testing of cloud applications. In Proc. of
IEEE APSCC 2009. Singapore.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
From Security to Assurance in the Cloud: A Survey :29
N.S. Chauhan, A. Saxena, and J.V.R. Murthy. October 2013. An Approach to Measure Security of Cloud
Hosted Application. In Proc. of IEEE CCEM 2013. Bangalore, India.
X. Chen, J. Andersen, Z.M. Mao, M. Bailey, and J. Nazario. June 2008. Towards an understanding of anti-
virtualization and anti-debugging behavior in modern malware. In Proc. of IEEE/IFIP DSN 2008. An-
chorage, AL, USA.
Y. Chen, V. Paxson, and R.H. Katz. January 2010. What’s New About Cloud Computing Security? Technical
Report No. UCB/EECS-2010-5, http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2010/EECS-2010-5.html.
A. Chonka, Y. Xiang, W. Zhou, and A. Bonti. 2011. Cloud security defence to protect cloud computing against
HTTP-DoS and XML-DoS attacks. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 34, 4 (July 2011),
1097–1107.
S.S.M. Chow, C.-K. Chu, X. Huang, J. Zhou, and R.H. Deng. 2012. Dynamic Secure Cloud Storage with
Provenance. In Cryptography and Security, D. Naccache (Ed.). Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 442–
464.
M. Christodorescu, R. Sailer, D.L. Schales, D. Sgandurra, and D. Zamboni. November 2009. Cloud Security
is Not (Just) Virtualization Security. In Proc. of ACM CCSW 2009. Chicago, Illinois, USA.
C.-K. Chu, S. S. M. Chow, W.-G. Tzeng, J. Zhou, and R. H. Deng. 2014. Key-Aggregate Cryptosystem for
Scalable Data Sharing in Cloud Storage. IEEE TPDS 25, 2 (February 2014), 468–477.
S. Cimato, E. Damiani, F. Zavatarelli, and R. Menicocci. June-July 2013. Towards the Certification of Cloud
Services. In Proc. of IEEE SERVICES 2013. Santa Clara, CA, USA.
CIO. 2012. Creating Effective Cloud Computing Contracts for the Federal Government – Best Practices for
Acquiring IT as a Service. Council and Chief Acquisition Officer Council. http://www.gsa.gov/portal/
mediaId/164011/fileName/cloudbestpractices.action.
L. Ciortea, C. Zamfir, S. Bucur, V. Chipounov, and G. Candea. 2010. Cloud9: A Software Testing Service.
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 43, 4 (January 2010), 5–10.
S. Clayman, A. Galis, C. Chapman, G. Toffetti, L. Rodero-Merino, L. Miguel Vaquero, K. Nagin, and B.
Rochwerger. 2010. Monitoring Service Clouds in the Future Internet. In Towards the Future Internet,
G. Tselentis, A. Galis, A. Gavras, S. Krco, V. Lotz, E. Simperl, B. Stiller, and T. Zahariadis (Eds.). IOS
Press, 115–126.
Cloud Accountability Project 2012. Cloud Accountability Project. http://www.a4cloud.eu/.
Cloud Security Alliance. 2010. Guidance for identity & access management V2.1. http://www.
cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance/csaguide-dom12-v2.10.pdf.
Cloud Security Alliance. 2011. Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing V3.0.
https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/guidance/csaguide.v3.0.pdf.
Cloud Security Alliance. 2013. The Notorious Nine Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013. https:
//downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/top threats/The Notorious Nine Cloud Computing
Top Threats in 2013.pdf.
Cloud Security on Demand 2012. Cloud Security on Demand. http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?
AWD ID=1218817&HistoricalAwards=false.
Cloud Standards Customer Council. August 2012. Security for Cloud Computing 10 Steps to Ensure Success.
http://www.cloud-council.org/Security for Cloud Computing-Final 080912.pdf.
CloudSec. October 2013. A Briefing on Cloud Security Challenges and Opportunities. http://www.telenor.
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/TelenorWhitepaperCloud-V 30 v.pdf.
Continuous Quality Assurance and Optimisation for Cloud brokers 2012. Continuous Quality Assurance and
Optimisation for Cloud brokers. http://www.broker-cloud.eu/.
CSA. 2014. CloudAudit: Automated Audit, Assertion, Assessment, and Assurance. https:
//cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/cloudaudit/.
K. Dahbur, B. Mohammad, and A.B. Tarakji. April 2011. A Survey of Risks, Threats and Vulnerabilities in
Cloud Computing. In Proc. of ISWSA 2011. Amman, Jordan.
E. Damiani, C.A. Ardagna, and N. El Ioini. 2009a. Open source systems security certification. Springer, New
York, NY, USA.
E. Damiani, N. El Ioini, A. Sillitti, and G. Succi. July 2009b. WS-Certificate. In Proc. of IEEE SERVICES I
2009. Los Angeles, CA, USA.
W. Dawoud, I. Takouna, and C. Meinel. March 2010. Infrastructure as a service security: Challenges and
solutions. In Proc. of INFOS 2010. Cairo, Egypt.
S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S. Foresti, S. Jajodia, S. Paraboschi, and P. Samarati. 2013. Integrity for Join
Queries in the Cloud. IEEE TCC 1, 2 (July-December 2013), 187–200.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
:30 C.A. Ardagna et al.
S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S. Foresti, and P. Samarati. 2014. Selective and Fine-Grained Access to Data in
the Cloud. In Secure Cloud Computing, S. Jajodia, K. Kant, P. Samarati, V. Swarup, and C. Wang (Eds.).
Springer.
M. Dekker and G. Hogben. December 2011. Survey and analysis of security parameters in
cloud SLAs across the European public sector. European Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA). http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/cloud-computing/
survey-and-analysis-of-security-parameters-in-cloud-slas-across-the-european-public-sector/
at download/fullReport.
Y. Desmedt. 2011. Covert Channels. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, H.C.A. van Tilborg and
S. Jajodia (Eds.). Springer.
M.H. Diallo, B. Hore, E.-C. Chang, S. Mehrotra, and N. Venkatasubramanian. June 2012. CloudProtect:
Managing Data Privacy in Cloud Applications. In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2012. Honolulu, HI, USA.
F. Doelitzscher, C. Reich, M. Knahl, and N. Clarke. 2013. Understanding Cloud Audits. In Privacy and
Security for Cloud Computing, S. Pearson and G. Yee (Eds.). Springer London, 125–163.
F. Doelitzscher, C. Reich, M. Knahl, A. Passfall, and N. Clarke. 2012. An agent based business aware incident
detection system for cloud environments. JoCCASA 1, 1 (2012), 1–19.
F. Doelitzscher, T. Ruebsamen, T. Karbe, M. Knahl, C. Reich, and N. Clarke. 2013. Sun Behind Clouds -
On Automatic Cloud Security Audits and a Cloud Audit Policy Language. International Journal on
Advances in Networks and Services 6, 1–2 (2013), 1–16.
A. Donevski, S. Ristov, and M. Gusev. May 2013. Security assessment of virtual machines in open source
clouds. In Proc. of MIPRO 2013. Opatija, Croatia.
D. Dranidis, E. Ramollari, and D. Kourtesis. November 2009. Run-time Verification of Behavioural Confor-
mance for Conversational Web Services. In Proc. of IEEE ECOWS 2009. Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
G. Dsouza, G. Rodriguez, Y. Al-Nashif, and S. Hariri. 2013. Building resilient cloud services using DDDAS
and moving target defence. JCC 2, 2/3 (2013), 171–190.
Empowering the service industry with SLA-aware infrastructures 2008. Empowering the service industry
with SLA-aware infrastructures. http://sla-at-soi.eu/.
Ensuring Trustworthiness and Security in Service Composition 2010. Ensuring Trustworthiness and Secu-
rity in Service Composition. http://www.aniketos.eu/.
ETSI. November 2013. Cloud Standards Coordination – Final Report. http://csc.etsi.org/Application/
documentapp/downloadimmediate/?docId=204.
D.A.B. Fernandes, L.F.B. Soares, J.V. Gomes, M.M. Freire, and P.R.M. Inacio. 2013. Security issues in cloud
environments: a survey. International Journal of Information Security (September 2013), 1–58.
M. Ficco, L. Tasquier, and R. Aversa. October 2013. Intrusion Detection in Cloud Computing. In Proc. of
3PGCIC 2013. Compiegne, France.
R. Focardi, R. Gorrieri, and F. Martinelli. 2004. Classification of Security Properties (Part II: Network Secu-
rity). In Foundations of Security Analysis and Design II - Tutorial Lectures, R. Focardi and R. Gorrieri
(Eds.). Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
H. Foster and G. Spanoudakis. March 2011a. Advanced Service Monitoring Configurations with SLA De-
composition and Selection. In Proc. of ACM SAC 2011. TaiChung, Taiwan.
H. Foster and G. Spanoudakis. May 2011b. SMaRT: A Workbench for Reporting the Monitorability of Ser-
vices from SLAs. In Proc. of PESOS 2011. Honolulu, HI, USA.
Ganglia. 2014. http://ganglia.sourceforge.net/.
J. Gao, X. Bai, andW.-T. Tsai. 2011. Cloud Testing-Issues, Challenges, Needs and Practice. SeiJ 1, 1 (Septem-
ber 2011).
J. Gao, X. Bai, W.-T. Tsai, and T. Uehara. 2013. SaaS Testing on Clouds - Issues, Challenges and Needs. Proc.
of IEEE SOSE 2013 (March 2013).
S.K. Garg, S. Versteeg, and R. Buyya. 2013. A framework for ranking of cloud computing services. Future
Generation Computer Systems 29, 4 (June 2013), 1012–1023.
German Federal Office for Information Security. August 2012. Security Recommendations for Cloud Com-
puting Providers. https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Minimum
information/SecurityRecommendationsCloudComputingProviders.pdf? blob=publicationFile.
E. Ghazizadeh, J.-L.A. Manan, M. Zamani, and A. Pashang. December 2012. A survey on security issues of
federated identity in the cloud computing. In Proc. of IEEE CloudCom 2012. Taipei, Taiwan.
C. Ghezzi and S. Guinea. 2007. Run-Time Monitoring in Service-Oriented Architectures. In Test and Analy-
sis of Web Services, L. Baresi and E. Di Nitto (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 237–264.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
From Security to Assurance in the Cloud: A Survey :31
M. Godfrey and M. Zulkernine. June 2013. A Server-Side Solution to Cache-Based Side-Channel Attacks in
the Cloud. In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2013. Santa Clara, CA, USA.
M. Green. 2013. The Threat in the Cloud. IEEE Security & Privacy 11, 1 (January-February 2013), 86–89.
B. Grobauer, T. Walloschek, and E. Stocker. 2011. Understanding Cloud Computing Vulnerabilities. IEEE
Security & Privacy 9, 2 (March-April 2011), 50–57.
N. Gruschka and L.L. Iacono. July 2009. Vulnerable Cloud: SOAP Message Security Validation Revisited.
In Proc. of IEEE ICWS 2009. Los Angeles, CA, USA.
N. Gruschka and M. Jensen. July 2010. Attack Surfaces: A Taxonomy for Attacks on Cloud Services. In Proc.
of IEEE CLOUD 2010. Miami, FL, USA.
A. Haeberlen. 2010. A Case for the Accountable Cloud. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 44, 2 (April
2010), 52–57.
S. Halle´ and R. Villemaire. March 2009. Runtime Monitoring of Web Service Choreographies Using Stream-
ing XML. In Proc. of ACM SAC 2009. Honolulu, HI, Hawaii.
W.M. Halton and S. Rahman. 2012. The Top Ten Cloud-security Practices in Next-generation Networking.
IJCNDS 8, 1/2 (December 2012), 70–84.
T. Hanawa, T. Banzai, H. Koizumi, R. Kanbayashi, T. Imada, and M. Sato. April 2010. Large-Scale Software
Testing Environment Using Cloud Computing Technology for Dependable Parallel and Distributed Sys-
tems. In Proc. of ICSTW 2010. Paris, France.
Z. Hao, S. Zhong, and N. Yu. 2011. A Time-Bound Ticket-Based Mutual Authentication Scheme for Cloud
Computing. IJCCC 6, 2 (2011), 227–235.
K. Hashizume, D.G. Rosado, E. Fernndez-Medina, and E.B. Fernandez. 2013. An analysis of security issues
for cloud computing. JISA 4, 1 (2013), 1–13.
G. Hogben and M. Dekker. 2012. Procure Secure: A guide to monitoring of secu-
rity service levels in cloud contracts. European Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA). http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/cloud-computing/
procure-secure-a-guide-to-monitoring-of-security-service-levels-in-cloud-contracts/at download/
fullReport.
V. Holub, T. Parsons, P. O’Sullivan, and J. Murphy. June 2009. Runtime correlation engine for system moni-
toring and testing. In Proc. of ICAC-INDST 2009. Barcelona, Spain.
I. Iankoulova and M. Daneva. May 2012. Cloud computing security requirements: A systematic review. In
Proc. of RCIS 2012. Valencia, Spain.
IATAC and DACS. 2007. Software Security Assurance: State of the Art Report (SOAR). http://www.dtic.mil/
cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA472363.
A.S. Ibrahim, J. Hamlyn-Harris, and J. Grundy. November-December 2010. Emerging Security Challenges
of Cloud Virtual Infrastructure. In Proc. of APSEC-CLOUD 2010. Sydney, Australia.
Infrastructure for Secure Cloud Computing 2013. Infrastructure for Secure Cloud Computing. http://www.
nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD ID=1253870&HistoricalAwards=false.
C. Irvine and T. Levin. December 1999. Toward a taxonomy and costing method for security services. In
Proc. of ACSAC 1999. Phoenix, AZ, USA.
S. Jajodia, W. Litwin, and T. Schwarz. 2013. Recoverable Encryption through a Noised Secret over a Large
Cloud. In Transactions on Large-Scale Data- and Knowledge-Centered Systems IX, A. Hameurlain,
J. Ku¨ng, and R. Wagner (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7980. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, 42–64.
W. Jansen and T. Grance. 2011. Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing. NIST SP-800-144,
http://www.nist.gov/manuscript-publication-search.cfm?pub id=909494.
D. Jayasinghe, G. Swint, S. Malkowski, J. Li, Q. Wang, J. Park, and C. Pu. June 2012. Expertus: A Generator
Approach to Automate Performance Testing in IaaS Clouds. In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2012. Honolulu,
HI, USA.
C. Jenkins. 2013. The three pillars of a secure hybrid cloud environment. Computer Fraud & Security 2013,
6 (June 2013), 13–15.
M. Jensen, J. Schwenk, N. Gruschka, and L.L. Iacono. July 2009. On Technical Security Issues in Cloud
Computing. In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2009. Los Angeles, CA, USA.
R. Jhawar and V. Piuri. August 2013. Adaptive Resource Management for Balancing Availability and Per-
formance in Cloud Computing. In Proc. of SECRYPT 2013. Vienna, Austria.
R. Jhawar, V. Piuri, and P. Samarati. December 2012. Supporting Security Requirements for Resource Man-
agement in Cloud Computing. In Proc. of IEEE CSE 2012. Paphos, Cyprus.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
:32 C.A. Ardagna et al.
S. Jin, J. Seol, and S. Maeng. May 2013. Towards Assurance of Availability in Virtualized Cloud System. In
Proc. of IEEE/ACM CCGrid 2013. Delft, The Netherlands.
A. Juels and A. Oprea. 2013. New Approaches to Security and Availability for Cloud Data. CACM 56, 2
(February 2013).
T. Jung, X.-Y. Li, and Z. Wan. April 2013. Privacy Preserving Cloud Data Access With Multi-Authorities. In
Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM 2013. Turin, Italy.
N. Kaaniche, A. Boudguiga, and M. Laurent. June 2013. ID Based Cryptography for Cloud Data Storage. In
Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2013. Santa Clara, CA, USA.
L. Kai, T. Weiqin, Z. Liping, and H. Chao. November 2013. SCM: A Design and Implementation of Monitoring
System for CloudStack. In Proc. of CSC 2013. Beijing, China.
C. Kalloniatis, V. Manousakis, H. Mouratidis, and S. Gritzalis. April 2013. Migrating into the Cloud: Identi-
fying the Major Security and Privacy Concerns. In Proc. of IFIP I3E 2013. Athens, Greece.
S. Kang, J. Lee, H. Jang, H. Lee, Y. Lee, S. Park, T. Park, and J. Song. June 2008. SeeMon: Scalable and
Energy-efficient Context Monitoring Framework for Sensor-rich Mobile Environments. In Proc. of Mo-
biSys 2008. Breckenridge, CO, USA.
L.M. Kaufman. 2010. Can Public-Cloud Security Meet Its Unique Challenges? IEEE Security & Privacy 8,
4 (July-August 2010), 55–57.
U. Khalid, A. Ghafoor, M. Irum, and M.A. Shibli. September 2013. Cloud Based Secure and Privacy En-
hanced Authentication & Authorization Protocol. In Proc. of KES 2013. Kitakyushu, Japan.
K.M. Khan and Q. Malluhi. 2010. Establishing Trust in Cloud Computing. IT Professional 12, 5 (September-
October 2010), 20–27.
T.M. King and A.S. Ganti. April 2010. Migrating Autonomic Self-Testing to the Cloud. In Proc of ICSTW
2010. Paris, France.
R.B. Knode. 2009. Digital Trust in the Cloud: Liquid Security in Cloudy Places. CSC. http://assets1.csc.com/
au/downloads/0610 20 Digital trust in the cloud.pdf.
F. Koeppe and J. Schneider. November-December 2010. Do You Get What You Pay For? Using Proof-of-Work
Functions to Verify Performance Assertions in the Cloud. In Proc. of IEEE CloudCom 2010. Indianapo-
lis, IN, USA.
D. Kourtesis, E. Ramollari, D. Dranidis, and I. Paraskakis. 2010. Increased reliability in SOA environ-
ments through registry-based conformance testing of Web services. Production Planning & Control 21,
2 (2010), 130–144.
F.J. Krautheim. June 2009. Private Virtual Infrastructure for Cloud Computing. In Proc. of HotCloud 2009.
San Diego, CA, USA.
M. Krotsiani, G. Spanoudakis, and K. Mahbub. August 2013. Incremental Certification of Cloud Services.
In Proc. of SECURWARE 2013. Barcelona, Spain.
A. Kurmus, M. Gupta, R. Pletka, C. Cachin, and R. Haas. December 2011. A Comparison of Secure Multi-
tenancy Architectures for Filesystem Storage Clouds. In Proc. of ACM/IFIP/USENIX Middleware
2011. Lisbon, Portugal.
U. Lang. November-December 2010. OpenPMF SCaaS: Authorization as a Service for Cloud & SOA Appli-
cations. In Proc. of IEEE CloudCom 2010. Indianapolis, IN, USA.
J.-H. Lee, M.-W. Park, J.-H. Eom, and T.-M. Chung. February 2011. Multi-level Intrusion Detection System
and log management in Cloud Computing. In Proc. of ICACT 2011. Gangwon-Do, South Korea.
H. Li, Y. Dai, and B. Yang. 2011a. Identity-Based Cryptography for Cloud Security. IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive 2011 (2011), 169.
J. Li, B. Li, T. Wo, C. Hu, J. Huai, L. Liu, and K.P. Lam. 2011b. CyberGuarder: A virtualization security
assurance architecture for green cloud computing. Future Generation Computer Systems 28, 2 (May
2011), 379–390.
M. Li, W. Zang, K. Bai, M. Yu, and P. Liu. December 2013. MyCloud: Supporting User-configured Privacy
Protection in Cloud Computing. In Proc. of ACSAC 2013. New Orleans, LA, USA.
B. Libert and J.-J. Quisquater. 2011. Identity-Based Cryptosystems. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and
Security, H.C.A. van Tilborg and S. Jajodia (Eds.). Springer.
H.-Y. Lin and W.-G. Tzeng. 2012. A Secure Erasure Code-Based Cloud Storage System with Secure Data
Forwarding. IEEE TPDS 23, 6 (June 2012), 995–1003.
H. Liu. October 2010. A New Form of DOS Attack in a Cloud and Its Avoidance Mechanism. In Proc. of ACM
CCSW 2010. Chicago, IL, USA.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
From Security to Assurance in the Cloud: A Survey :33
X. Liu, Y. Xia, S. Jiang, F. Xia, and Y. Wang. July 2013. Hierarchical Attribute-Based Access Control with
Authentication for Outsourced Data in Cloud Computing. In Proc. of IEEE TrustCom 2013. Melbourne,
Australia.
F. Lombardi and R. Di Pietro. 2011. Secure virtualization for cloud computing. Journal of Network and
Computer Applications 34, 4 (July 2011), 1113–1122.
F. Lombardi and R. Di Pietro. March 2010. Transparent Security for Cloud. In Proc. of ACM SAC 2010.
Sierre, Switzerland.
W. Lu, X. Hu, S. Wang, and X. Li. 2014. A Multi-Criteria QoS-aware Trust Service Composition Algorithm
in Cloud Computing Environments. IJGDC 7, 1 (2014), 77–88.
W. Luo, L. Xu, Z. Zhan, Q. Zheng, and S. Xu. 2014. Federated Cloud Security Architecture for Secure and
Agile Clouds. In High Performance Cloud Auditing and Applications, K.J. Han, B.-Y. Choi, and S. Song
(Eds.). Springer New York.
W. Ma, X. Li, Y. Shi, and Y. Guo. 2013. A Virtual Machine Cloning Approach Based on Trusted Computing.
TELKOMNIKA 11, 11 (November 2013), 6935–6942.
I. MacNeil and X. Li. 2006. ”Comply or Explain”: market discipline and non-compliance with the Combined
Code. Corporate Governance: An International Review 14, 5 (2006), 486–496.
K. Mahbub and G. Spanoudakis. 2007. Monitoring WS-Agreements: An Event CalculusBased Approach. In
Test and Analysis of Web Services, L. Baresi and E. Di Nitto (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 265–306.
K. Mahbub and G. Spanoudakis. November 2004. A Framework for Requirents Monitoring of Service Based
Systems. In Proc. of ICSOC 2004. New York, NY, USA.
R. Mahmood, N. Esfahani, T. Kacem, N. Mirzaei, S. Malek, and A. Stavrou. June 2012. A whitebox ap-
proach for automated security testing of Android applications on the cloud. In Proc. of AST 2012. Zurich,
Switzerland.
S. Mansfield-Devine. 2008. Danger in the clouds. Network Security 2008, 12 (December 2008), 9–11.
D.C. Marinescu, A. Paya, J.P. Morrison, and P.D. Healy. 2013. An Auction-driven Self-organizing Cloud
Delivery Model. CoRR abs/1312.2998 (2013).
M.L. Massie, B.N. Chun, and D.E. Culler. 2004. The ganglia distributed monitoring system: design, imple-
mentation, and experience. Parallel Comput. 30, 7 (July 2004), 817–840.
M. Massie, B. Li, B. Nicholes, V. Vuksan, R. Alexander, J. Buchbinder, F. Costa, A. Dean, D. Josephsen, P.
Phaal, and D. Pocock. 2012.Monitoring with Ganglia – Tracking Dynamic Host and Application Metrics
at Scale. O’Reilly Media.
M. McIntosh and P. Austel. November 2005. XML Signature Element Wrapping Attacks and Countermea-
sures. In Proc. of SWS 2005. Fairfax, VA, USA.
S. Mei, H. Ba, F. Tu, J. Ren, and Z. Wang. September 2013. TTP-ACE: A Trusted Third Party for Auditing
in Cloud Environment. In Proc. of ICSCTEA 2013. September.
P. Mell and T. Grance. 2011. The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. NIST SP-800-145, http://csrc.nist.
gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.
S. Meng and L. Liu. 2013. Enhanced Monitoring-as-a-Service for Effective Cloud Management. IEEE TC 62,
9 (September 2013), 1705–1720.
C. Modi, D. Patel, B. Borisaniya, A. Patel, and M. Rajarajan. 2013a. A Survey on Security Issues and Solu-
tions at Different Layers of Cloud Computing. Journal of Supercomputing 63, 2 (February 2013).
C. Modi, D. Patel, B. Borisaniya, H. Patel, A. Patel, and M. Rajarajan. 2013b. A survey of intrusion detection
techniques in Cloud. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 36, 1 (June 2013), 42–57.
M. H. Mohamaddiah, A. Abdullah, S. Subramaniam, and M. Hussin. 2014. A Survey on Resource Allocation
and Monitoring in Cloud Computing. IJMLC 4, 1 (February 2014).
A.T. Monfared and M.G. Jaatun. November-December 2011. Monitoring Intrusions and Security Breaches
in Highly Distributed Cloud Environments. In Proc. of IEEE CloudCom 2011. Athens, Greece.
J. Moreno. 2010. A Testing Framework for Cloud Storage Systems. Master Thesis – ETH Zu¨rich, http://
e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:1987/eth-1987-01.pdf.
T. Morris. 2011. Trusted PlatformModule. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, H.C.A. van Tilborg
and S. Jajodia (Eds.). Springer.
O. Moser, F. Rosenberg, and S. Dustdar. April 2008. Non-intrusive Monitoring and Service Adaptation for
WS-BPEL. In Proc. of WWW 2008. Beijing, China.
H. Mouratidis, S. Islam, C. Kalloniatis, and S. Gritzalis. 2013. A framework to support selection of cloud
providers based on security and privacy requirements. JSS 86, 9 (March 2013), 2276–2293.
A. Mun˜oz and A. Man˜a. June 2013. Bridging the GAP between Software Certification and Trusted Comput-
ing for Securing Cloud Computing. In Proc. of IEEE SERVICES 2013. Santa Clara, CA, USA.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
:34 C.A. Ardagna et al.
I. Muttik and C. Barton. 2009. Cloud security technologies. Information Security Technical Report 14, 1
(2009), 1–6.
M. Nabeel, N. Shang, and E. Bertino. 2013. Privacy Preserving Policy-Based Content Sharing in Public
Clouds. IEEE TKDE 25, 11 (November 2013), 2602–2614.
Nagios. 2014. Cloud Computing. http://www.nagios.com/solutions/cloud-computing.
Network of Excellence on Engineering Secure Future Internet Software Services and Systems 2010. Net-
work of Excellence on Engineering Secure Future Internet Software Services and Systems. http://www.
nessos-project.eu/.
J. Ni, Y. Yu, Y. Mu, and Q. Xia. 2014. On the Security of an Efficient Dynamic Auditing Protocol in Cloud
Storage. IEEE TPDS (2014).
K. Okamura and Y. Oyama. March 2010. Load-based Covert Channels Between Xen Virtual Machines. In
Proc. of ACM SAC 2010. Sierre, Switzerland.
M. Okuhara, T. Shiozaki, and T. Suzuki. 2010. Security Architectures for Cloud Computing. Fujitsu scientific
and technical journal 46, 4 (October 2010), 397–402.
OpenStack Open Source Cloud Computing Software 2015. OpenStack Open Source Cloud Computing Soft-
ware. https://www.openstack.org/.
N. Paladi, C. Gehrmann, and F. Morenius. March 2013. State of The Art and Hot Aspects in Cloud Data
Storage Security. SICS technical report T2013:01.
M.P. Papazoglou, V. Andrikopoulos, and S. Benbernou. 2011. Managing Evolving Services. IEEE Software
28, 3 (May-June 2011), 49–55.
S. Paquette, P.T. Jaeger, and S.C. Wilson. 2010. Identifying the security risks associated with governmental
use of cloud computing. Government Information Quarterly 27, 3 (April 2010), 245–253.
K.-W. Park, J. Han, J. Chung, and K.H. Park. 2013. THEMIS: A Mutually Verifiable Billing System for the
Cloud Computing Environment. IEEE TSC 6, 3 (July-September 2013), 300–313.
T. Parveen and S. Tilley. April 2010. When to Migrate Software Testing to the Cloud?. In Proc of ICSTW
2010. Paris, France.
A. Patel, M. Taghavi, K. Bakhtiyari, and J. Celestino Ju´Nior. 2013. An Intrusion Detection and Prevention
System in Cloud Computing: A Systematic Review. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 36,
1 (January 2013), 25–41.
E. Pattuk, M. Kantarcioglu, V. Khadilkar, H. Ulusoy, and S. Mehrotra. June 2013. BigSecret: A Secure Data
Management Framework for Key-Value Stores. In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2013. Santa Clara, CA, USA.
M. Pearce, S. Zeadally, and R. Hunt. 2013. Virtualization: Issues, Security Threats, and Solutions. ACM
CSUR 45, 2 (February 2013), 17:1–17:39.
S. Pearson. 2011. Toward Accountability in the Cloud. IEEE Internet Computing 15, 4 (2011), 64–69.
S. Pearson. 2013. Privacy, Security and Trust in Cloud Computing. In Privacy and Security for Cloud Com-
puting, S. Pearson and G. Yee (Eds.). Springer London, 3–42.
S. Pearson and A. Benameur. November-December 2010. Privacy, Security and Trust Issues Arising from
Cloud Computing. In Proc. of IEEE CloudCom 2010. Indianapolis, IN, USA.
S. Pearson, Y. Shen, and M. Mowbray. December 2009. A Privacy Manager for Cloud Computing. In Proc. of
CloudCom 2009. Beijing, China.
D. Perez-Botero, J. Szefer, and R.B. Lee. May 2013. Characterizing Hypervisor Vulnerabilities in Cloud
Computing Servers. In Proc. of ASIACCS-SCC 2013. Hangzhou, China.
G. Peterson. 2010. Don’t Trust. And Verify: A Security Architecture Stack for the Cloud. IEEE Security &
Privacy 8, 5 (September-October 2010), 83–86.
C. Pham, D. Chen, Z. Kalbarczyk, and R.K. Iyer. June 2011. CloudVal: A framework for validation of virtu-
alization environment in cloud infrastructure. In Proc of IEEE/IFIP DSN 2011. Hong Kong, China.
Policy and Security Configuration Management 2010. Policy and Security Configuration Management. http:
//www.posecco.eu/.
G. Porter. 2013. Cloud Service Provider Methods for Managing Insider Threats: Analysis Phase I. Technical
Note, CMU/SEI-2013-TN-020.
B. Preneel. 2011. MAC Algorithms. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, H.C.A. van Tilborg and
S. Jajodia (Eds.). Springer.
B. Qin, H. Wang, Q. Wu, J. Liu, and J. Domingo-Ferrer. 2013. Simultaneous authentication and secrecy in
identity-based data upload to cloud. Cluster Computing 16, 4 (April 2013), 845–859.
M.N. Rajkumar, V.V. Kumar, and R. Sivaramakrishnan. 2013. Efficient Integrity Auditing Services for Cloud
Computing Using Raptor Codes. In Proc. of ACM RACS 2013. Montreal, QC, Canada.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
From Security to Assurance in the Cloud: A Survey :35
J. Rao, Y. Wei, J. Gong, and C.-Z. Xu. 2013. QoS Guarantees and Service Differentiation for Dynamic Cloud
Applications. IEEE TNSM 10, 1 (March 2013), 43–55.
H. Rasheed. 2013. Data and infrastructure security auditing in cloud computing environments. IJIM (De-
cember 2013).
M. Raykova, H. Zhao, and S.M. Bellovin. February-March 2012. Privacy Enhanced Access Control for Out-
sourced Data Sharing. In Proc. of FC 2012. Bonaire.
K. Ren, C. Wang, and Q. Wang. 2012. Security Challenges for the Public Cloud. IEEE Internet Computing
16, 1 (January-February 2012), 69–73.
Resources and Services Virtualization without Barriers 2008. Resources and Services Virtualization without
Barriers. http://www.reservoir-fp7.eu/.
Risk Assessment Techniques for Off-line and On-line Security Evaluation of Cloud Computing 2013. Risk
Assessment Techniques for Off-line and On-line Security Evaluation of Cloud Computing. http://www.
nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD ID=1332035&HistoricalAwards=false.
T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage. November 2009. Hey, You, Get off of My Cloud:
Exploring Information Leakage in Third-party Compute Clouds. In Proc. of ACM CCS 2009. Chicago,
IL, USA.
L.M. Riungu, O. Taipale, and K. Smolander. November-December 2010. Research Issues for Software Test-
ing in the Cloud. In Proc. of IEEE CloudCom 2010. Indianapolis, IN, USA.
F. Rocha and M. Correia. June 2011. Lucy in the sky without diamonds: Stealing confidential data in the
cloud. In Proc. of IEEE/IFIP DSN-W 2011. Hong Kong, China.
L. Rodero-Merino, L.M. Vaquero, E. Caron, A. Muresan, and F. Desprez. 2012. Building safe PaaS clouds:
A survey on security in multitenant software platforms. Computers & Security 31, 1 (February 2012),
96–108.
C. Rong, S.T. Nguyen, and M.G. Jaatun. 2013. Beyond lightning: A survey on security challenges in cloud
computing. Computers & Electrical Engineering 39, 1 (May 2013), 47–54.
S. Ruj, M. Stojmenovic, and A. Nayak. 2014. Decentralized Access Control with Anonymous Authentication
of Data Stored in Clouds. IEEE TPDS 25, 2 (February 2014), 384–394.
M.D. Ryan. 2013. Cloud computing security: The scientific challenge, and a survey of solutions. JSS 86, 9
(February 2013), 2263–2268.
S.H. Ryu, F. Casati, H. Skogsrud, B. Betanallah, and R. Saint-Paul. 2008. Supporting the Dynamic Evolution
of Web Service Protocols in Service-Oriented Architectures. ACM TWEB 2, 2 (April 2008), 13:1–13:46.
S. Sakr and A. Liu. June 2012. SLA-Based and Consumer-centric Dynamic Provisioning for Cloud
Databases. In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2012. Honolulu, HI, Hawaii.
M. Salifu, Yijun Yu, and B. Nuseibeh. October 2007. Specifying Monitoring and Switching Problems in
Context. In Proc. of IEEE RE 2007. New Delhi, India.
N. Santos, R. Rodrigues, K.P. Gummadi, and S. Saroiu. August 2012. Policy-sealed data: A new abstraction
for building trusted cloud services. In Proc. of USENIX Security Symposium 2012. Bellevue, WA, USA.
P. Saripalli and B. Walters. 2010. QUIRC: A Quantitative Impact and Risk Assessment Framework for Cloud
Security. In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2010. Miami, FL, USA.
M. Schumacher, E.B. Fernandez, D. Hybertson, F. Buschmann, and P. Sommerlad. 2006. Security Patterns:
Integrating security and systems engineering. Wiley.
Secure and Privacy-assured Data Service Outsourcing in Cloud Computing 2012. Secure and Privacy-
assured Data Service Outsourcing in Cloud Computing. http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?
AWD ID=1262277&HistoricalAwards=false.
Secure Data-Intensive Computing on Hybrid Clouds 2012. Secure Data-Intensive Computing on Hybrid
Clouds. http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD ID=1223495&HistoricalAwards=false.
Secure Provision and Consumption in the Internet of Services 2010. Secure Provision and Consumption in
the Internet of Services. http://www.spacios.eu/.
Secure Provisioning of Cloud Services based on SLA management 2013. Secure Provisioning of Cloud Ser-
vices based on SLA management. http://specs-project.eu/.
J. Sedayao, S. Su, X. Ma, M. Jiang, and K. Miao. December 2009. A Simple Technique for Securing Data at
Rest Stored in a Computing Cloud. In Proc. of CloudCom 2009. Beijing, China.
SEI 2011. SecuringWeb Services for Army SOA. (2011). http://www.sei.cmu.edu/solutions/softwaredev/securing-
web-services.cfm.
S. Sengupta, V. Kaulgud, and V.S. Sharma. July 2011. Cloud Computing Security–Trends and Research
Directions. In Proc. of IEEE SERVICES 2011. Washington, VA, USA.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
:36 C.A. Ardagna et al.
J. Shao, H. Wei, Q. Wang, and H. Mei. July 2010. A Runtime Model Based Monitoring Approach for Cloud.
In Proc. of IEEE CLOUD 2010. Miami, FL, USA.
S. Shetty. June-July 2013. Auditing and Analysis of Network Traffic in Cloud Environment. In Proc. of IEEE
SERVICES 2013. Santa Clara, CA, USA.
A. Shraer, C. Cachin, A. Cidon, I. Keidar, Y. Michalevsky, and D. Shaket. October 2010. Venus: Verification
for Untrusted Cloud Storage. In Proc. of ACM CCSW 2010. Chicago, IL, USA.
J. Simmonds, Y. Gan, M. Chechik, S. Nejati, B. O’Farrell, E. Litani, and J. Waterhouse. 2009. Runtime
Monitoring of Web Service Conversations. IEEE TSC 2, 3 (July–September 2009), 223–244.
M. Singhal, S. Chandrasekhar, T. Ge, R. Sandhu, R. Krishnan, G.-J. Ahn, and E. Bertino. 2013. Collabora-
tion in multicloud computing environments: Framework and security issues. Computer 46, 2 (February
2013), 76–84.
J. Somorovsky, M. Heiderich, M. Jensen, J. Schwenk, N. Gruschka, and L. Lo Iacono. 2011. All Your Clouds
Are Belong to Us: Security Analysis of Cloud Management Interfaces. In Proc. of ACM CCSW 2011.
Chicago, IL, USA.
Z. Song, J. Molina, S. Lee, H. Lee, S. Kotani, and R. Masuoka. 2009. TrustCube: An Infrastructure that
Builds Trust in Client. In Future of Trust in Computing, D. Gawrock, H. Reimer, A.-R. Sadeghi, and
C. Vishik (Eds.). Vieweg+Teubner, 68–79.
G. Spanoudakis, E. Damiani, and A. Man˜a. October 2012. Certifying Services in Cloud: The Case for a
Hybrid, Incremental and Multi-layer Approach. In Proc. of IEEE HASE 2012. Omaha, NE, USA.
M.K. Srinivasan, K. Sarukesi, P. Rodrigues, M.S. Manoj, and P. Revathy. August 2012. State-of-the-art
Cloud Computing Security Taxonomies: A Classification of Security Challenges in the Present Cloud
Computing Environment. In Proc. of ICACCI 2012. Chennai, India.
M. Srivatsa and A. Iyengar. 2011. Application-Level Denial of Service. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and
Security, H.C.A. van Tilborg and S. Jajodia (Eds.). Springer.
O. Starov and S. Vilkomir. May 2013. Integrated TaaS platform for mobile development: Architecture solu-
tions. In Proc. of AST 2013. San Francisco, CA, USA.
E. Stefanov, M. van Dijk, A. Juels, and A. Oprea. December 2012. Iris: A Scalable Cloud File System with
Efficient Integrity Checks. In Proc. of ACSAC 2012. Orlando, FL, USA.
S.J. Stolfo, M.B. Salem, and A.D. Keromytis. May 2012. Fog Computing: Mitigating Insider Data Theft
Attacks in the Cloud. In Proc. of IEEE SPW 2012. San Francisco, CA, USA.
S. Subashini and V. Kavitha. 2011. A Survey on Security Issues in Service Delivery Models of Cloud Com-
puting. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 34, 1 (January 2011), 1–11.
A. Sulistio and C. Reich. September 2013. Towards a Self-protecting Cloud. In Proc. of OTM 2013. Graz,
Austria.
S. Sundareswaran, A. C. Squicciarini, and D. Lin. 2012. Ensuring Distributed Accountability for Data Shar-
ing in the Cloud. IEEE TDSC 9, 4 (July 2012), 556–568.
A. Sunyaev and S. Schneider. 2013. Cloud Services Certification. CACM 56, 2 (February 2013), 33–36.
J. Szefer and R.B. Lee. 2014. Hardware-Enhanced Security for Cloud Computing. In Secure Cloud Comput-
ing, S. Jajodia, K. Kant, P. Samarati, V. Swarup, and C. Wang (Eds.). Springer.
H. Takabi and J.B.D. Joshi. January 2012. Policy Management as a Service: An Approach to Manage Policy
Heterogeneity in Cloud Computing Environment. In Proc. of HICSS 2012. Maui, HI, Hawaii.
H. Takabi, J.B.D. Joshi, and Gail-Joon Ahn. 2010b. Security and Privacy Challenges in Cloud Computing
Environments. IEEE Security & Privacy 8, 6 (November-December 2010), 24–31.
H. Takabi, J.B.D. Joshi, and G.-J. Ahn. July 2010a. SecureCloud: Towards a Comprehensive Security Frame-
work for Cloud Computing Environments. In Proc. of IEEE COMPSACW 2010. Seoul, South Korea.
T. Takahashi, G. Blanc, Y. Kadobayashi, D. Fall, H. Hazeyama, and S. Matsuo. April 2012. Enabling se-
cure multitenancy in cloud computing: Challenges and approaches. In Proc. of BCFIC 2012. Vilnius,
Lithuania.
Y. Tang, P. P. C. Lee, J. C. S. Lui, and R. Perlman. 2012. Secure Overlay Cloud Storage with Access Control
and Assured Deletion. IEEE TDSC 9, 6 (November 2012), 903–916.
D. Thebeau II, B. Reidy, R. Valerdi, A. Gudagi, H. Kurra, Y. Al-Nashif, S. Hariri, and F. Sheldon. March 2014.
Improving Cyber Resiliency of Cloud Application Services by Applying Software Behavior Encryption
(SBE). In Proc. of CSER 2014. Redondo Beach, CA, USA.
Trend Micro. April 2013. Best Practices for Security and Compliance with Amazon Web Services. https:
//reinvent.awsevents.com/files/TrendMicro Whitepaper.pdf.
H.-L. Truong c and T. Fahringer. 2004. SCALEA-G: A Unified Monitoring and Performance Analysis System
for the Grid. Scientific Programming 12, 4 (December 2004), 225–237.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
From Security to Assurance in the Cloud: A Survey :37
H.-Y. Tsai, M. Siebenhaar, A. Miede, Y.-L. Huang, and R. Steinmetz. 2012. Threat as a Service? Virtualiza-
tion’s Impact on Cloud Security. IT Professional 14, 1 (January-February 2012), 32–37.
W.-T. Tsai, P. Zhong, J. Balasooriya, Y. Chen, X. Bai, and J. Elston. June-July 2011. An Approach for Service
Composition and Testing for Cloud Computing. In Proc. of ISADS 2011. Kobe, Japan.
P.K. Tysowski and M.A. Hasan. 2013. Hybrid Attribute- and Re-Encryption-Based Key Management for
Secure and Scalable Mobile Applications in Clouds. IEEE TCC 1, 2 (July 2013), 172–186.
M. van Dijk, A. Juels, A. Oprea, R.L. Rivest, E. Stefanov, and N. Triandopoulos. October 2012. Hourglass
Schemes: How to Prove That Cloud Files Are Encrypted. In Proc. of ACM CCS 2012. Raleigh, NC, USA.
E. van Veenendaal. October 2012. Standard glossary of terms used in Software Testing. International Soft-
ware Testing Qualifications Board (ISTQB). http://www.istqb.org/downloads/finish/20/101.html.
L.M. Vaquero, L. Rodero-Merino, and D. Moran. 2011. Locking the Sky: A Survey on IaaS Cloud Security.
Computing 91, 1 (January 2011), 93–118.
M. Velten and F. Stumpf. November 2013. Secure and Privacy-Aware Multiplexing of Hardware-Protected
TPM Integrity Measurements among Virtual Machines. In Proc. of ICISC 2012. Seoul, South Korea.
Z. Wan, J. Liu, and R.-H. Deng. 2012. HASBE: A Hierarchical Attribute-Based Solution for Flexible and
Scalable Access Control in Cloud Computing. IEEE TIFS 7, 2 (April 2012), 743–754.
B. Wang, S.S.M. Chow, M. Li, and H. Li. July 2013a. Storing Shared Data on the Cloud via Security-
Mediator. In Proc. of IEEE ICDCS 2013. Philadelphia, PA, USA.
B. Wang, B. Li, and H. Li. 2014. Oruta: Privacy-Preserving Public Auditing for Shared Data in the Cloud.
IEEE TCC (2014).
B. Wang, B. Li, and H. Li. April 2013. Public auditing for shared data with efficient user revocation in the
cloud. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM 2013. Turin, Italy.
C. Wang, N. Cao, K. Ren, and W. Lou. 2012. Enabling Secure and Efficient Ranked Keyword Search over
Outsourced Cloud Data. IEEE TPDS 23, 8 (August 2012), 1467–1479.
C. Wang, S.S.M. Chow, Q. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou. 2013b. Privacy-Preserving Public Auditing for Secure
Cloud Storage. IEEE TC 62, 2 (February 2013), 362–375.
C. Wang, Q. Wang, K. Ren, N. Cao, and W. Lou. 2012. Toward Secure and Dependable Storage Services in
Cloud Computing. IEEE TSC 5, 2 (April 2012), 220–232.
C. Wang, Q. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou. March 2010. Privacy-Preserving Public Auditing for Data Storage
Security in Cloud Computing. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM 2010. San Diego, CA, USA.
M. Wang, V. Holub, T. Parsons, J. Murphy, and P. O’Sullivan. March 2010. Scalable Run-Time Correlation
Engine for Monitoring in a Cloud Computing Environment. In Proc. of IEEE ECBS 2010. Oxford, UK.
Q. Wang, C. Wang, K. Ren, W. Lou, and J. Li. 2011. Enabling Public Auditability and Data Dynamics for
Storage Security in Cloud Computing. IEEE TPDS 22, 5 (May 2011), 847–859.
J. Wei, C. Pu, C.V. Rozas, A. Rajan, and F. Zhu. November-December 2013. Modeling the Runtime Integrity
of Cloud Servers: A Scoped Invariant Perspective. In Proc. of IEEE CloudCom 2010. Indianapolis, IN,
USA.
L. Wei and M.K. Reiter. September 2012. Third-Party Private DFA Evaluation on Encrypted Files in the
Cloud. In Proc. of ESORICS 2012. Pisa, Italy.
L. Wei and M.K. Reiter. September 2013. Ensuring File Authenticity in Private DFA Evaluation on En-
crypted Files in the Cloud. In Proc. of ESORICS 2013. Egham, UK.
L. Wei, H. Zhu, Z. Cao, X. Dong, W. Jia, Y. Chen, and A.V. Vasilakos. April 2014. Security and privacy for
storage and computation in cloud computing. Information Sciences 258 (April April 2014), 371–386.
P. Wieder, J.M. Butler, W. Theilmann, and R. Yahyapour. 2011. Service Level Agreements for Cloud Comput-
ing. Springer.
Z. Xiao and Y. Xiao. 2013. Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing. IEEE Communications Surveys &
Tutorials 15, 2 (April-June 2013), 843–859.
T. Xing, D. Huang, L. Xu, C.-J. Chung, and P. Khatkar. March 2013. SnortFlow: A OpenFlow-Based Intrusion
Prevention System in Cloud Environment. In Proc. of GENI GREE 2012. New Utah, UT, USA.
L. Xu, X. Cao, Y. Zhang, and W. Wu. 2013a. Software Service Signature (S3) for authentication in cloud
computing. Cluster Computing 16, 4 (December 2013), 905–914.
Z. Xu, C. Wang, Q. Wang, K. Ren, and L. Wang. April 2013b. Proof-carrying cloud computation: The case of
convex optimization. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM 2013. Turin, Italy.
K. Yang and X. Jia. 2013. An Efficient and Secure Dynamic Auditing Protocol for Data Storage in Cloud
Computing. IEEE TPDS 24, 9 (September 2013), 1717–1726.
K. Yang, X. Jia, K. Ren, and B. Zhang. April 2013. DAC-MACS: Effective data access control for multi-
authority cloud storage systems. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM 2013. Turin, Italy.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
:38 C.A. Ardagna et al.
L. Ye, H. Zhang, J. Shi, and X. Du. December 2012. Verifying cloud Service Level Agreement. In Proc. of
IEEE GLOBECOM 2012. Anaheim, CA, USA.
Y.A. Younis, M. Merabti, and K. Kifayat. 2013. Secure Cloud Computing for Critical Infrastructure A Survey.
http://www.cms.livjm.ac.uk/pgnet2013/proceedings/papers/1569764399.pdf.
J. Yu, P. Lu, Y. Zhu, G. Xue, and M. Li. 2013a. Toward Secure Multikeyword Top-k Retrieval over Encrypted
Cloud Data. IEEE TDSC 10, 4 (July 2013), 239–250.
L. Yu, W.-T. Tsai, X. Chen, L. Liu, Y. Zhao, L. Tang, and W. Zhao. June 2010a. Testing as a Service over
Cloud. In Proc. of IEEE SOSE 2010. Nanjing, China.
S. Yu, Y. Tian, S. Guo, and D. Wu. 2013b. Can We Beat DDoS Attacks in Clouds? IEEE TPDS (July 2013).
S. Yu, C. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou. March 2010b. Achieving Secure, Scalable, and Fine-grained Data Access
Control in Cloud Computing. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM 2010. San Diego, CA, USA.
S. Zawoad, A.K. Dutta, and R. Hasan. May 2013. SecLaaS: Secure Logging-as-a-service for Cloud Forensics.
In Proc. of ACM ASIACCS 2013. Hangzhou, China.
P. Zech. March 2011. Risk-Based Security Testing in Cloud Computing Environments. In Proc. of IEEE ICST
2011. Berlin, Germany.
Y. Zhang, A. Juels, M.K. Reiter, and T. Ristenpart. October 2012. Cross-VM Side Channels and Their Use to
Extract Private Keys. In Proc. of ACM CCS 2012.
Y. Zhang and M.K. Reiter. November 2013. Du¨ppel: Retrofitting Commodity Operating Systems to Mitigate
Cache Side Channels in the Cloud. In Proc. of ACM CCS 2013. Berlin, Germany.
L. Zhao, Y. Ren, M. Li, and K. Sakurai. 2012. Flexible service selection with user-specific QoS support in
service-oriented architecture. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 35, 3 (March 2012), 962–
973.
M. Zhou, R. Zhang, W. Xie, W. Qian, and A. Zhou. November 2010. Security and Privacy in Cloud Computing:
A Survey. In Proc. of SKG 2010. Ningbo, China.
Y. Zhu, G.-J. Ahn, H. Hu, S. S. Yau, H. G. An, and C.-J. Hu. 2013. Dynamic Audit Services for Outsourced
Storages in Clouds. IEEE TSC 6, 2 (April 2013), 227–238.
Y. Zhu, H. Hu, G.-J. Ahn, D. Huang, and S. Wang. March 2012. Towards temporal access control in cloud
computing. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM 2012. Orlando, FL, USA.
D. Zissis and D. Lekkas. 2012. Addressing Cloud Computing Security Issues. Future Generation Computer
Systems 28, 3 (March 2012), 583–592.
D. Zou, W. Zhang, W. Qiang, G. Xiang, L.T. Yang, H. Jin, and K. Hu. 2013. Design and implementation of a
trusted monitoring framework for cloud platforms. Future Generation Computer Systems 29, 8 (October
2013), 2092–2102.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
From Security to Assurance in the Cloud: A Survey :39
A. MISCELLANEA
A.1. Vulnerabilities, threats, attacks, and risk evaluation
In this section, we extend the discussion in Section 3 and provide an overview of vul-
nerabilities, threats, and attacks that insist on more than one attack surface in Sec-
tion 2, without a preferred surface for a successful exploit.
Paquette et al. [Paquette et al. 2010] analyze the risks faced by a governmental in-
stitution moving to the cloud and highlight the need for risk management. Saripalli
and Walters [Saripalli and Walters 2010] present QUIRC, a quantitative risk and im-
pact assessment framework that permits to assess security risks in cloud computing
platforms, mainly considering confidentiality, integrity, and availability. QUIRC en-
ables customer to compare the robustness of cloud providers’ offerings. Grobauer et
al. [Grobauer et al. 2011] study cloud computing vulnerabilities and their impact on
cloud. They also propose some indicators of cloud-specific vulnerabilities on the basis
of risk factors. Dahbur et al. [Dahbur et al. 2011] present a survey on risks, threats,
and vulnerabilities in cloud computing. In addition to attempting a novel definition of
the concepts of risks, threats, and vulnerabilities in the cloud, it presents some real
world examples of attacks: i) using IaaS to host crimeware, where cloud resources are
used as startup points for attacks that target both cloud and external applications and
resources; ii) virtualization attacks, where tenant-on-tenant attacks in general, and
the blue pill rootkit3 in particular, are described; iii) cloud computing outage and data
loss, where some successful attacks on providers like Salesforce.com and Rackspace
are presented. Booth et al. [Booth et al. 2013] present a different classification of cloud
security, which is built around attack strategies and corresponding defenses. The paper
classifies attacks and defenses using the following categories: denial of service, breach
of confidentiality, data availability and integrity, data confidentiality. In the discussion,
different attacks belonging to tenant-on-tenant and provider-on-tenant attack surfaces
are described.
A.2. Cloud security
In this section, we extend the discussion in Section 4 and present a summary of tech-
niques selected on the basis of criteria in Section 2.1 and spanning more than one of
the cloud security macro-areas identified in Section 2.2.
Okuhara et al. [Okuhara et al. 2010] propose Trusted-Service Platform, an ac-
cess control, authentication, and identification platform for cloud services. Takabi et
al. [Takabi et al. 2010a] present SecureCloud, a security framework for the cloud that
consists of different modules for managing security and trust. In particular, Secure-
Cloud focuses on identity management, access control, policy integration among mul-
tiple clouds, trust management between different clouds and between a cloud and its
users, secure service composition and integration, and semantic heterogeneity among
policies from different clouds. An interesting line of research is the one providing
cloud-specific version of general-purpose security patterns [Schumacher et al. 2006].
Peterson [Peterson 2010] presents a security stack for the cloud that builds on four
patterns: i) gateway as the defensive structure to limit attack surface and enforce poli-
cies, ii) monitor to collect and analyze cloud events, iii) security token service to issue,
validate, and exchange tokens, iv) policy enforcement point/policy decision point to de-
fine, evaluate, and enforce policies. Patterns are based on different security techniques,
including access control, encryption, and authentication. Li et al. [Li et al. 2011b]
3The blue pill rootkit forces an operating system that believes to run on a real system, to execute on a virtual
version of it. It traps the running operating system by deploying a thin hypervisor and virtualizing the rest
of the machine under it. All communications can then be intercepted by the hypervisor, which can further
send fake replies.
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present a virtualization security assurance architecture, called CyberGuarder, which
addresses security problems in the context of green cloud computing. CyberGuarder
includes a virtual machine security service, a virtual network security service, and a
policy-based trust management service. Jhawar et al. [Jhawar et al. 2012] propose a
novel cloud resource allocation algorithm that takes into account security (and also
availability and reliability) requirements. Their framework allows providers to define
regulations on the allocation of their resources and customers to express constraints
on the distribution of their virtual machines (e.g., geographical placement). Bernsmed
et al. [Bernsmed et al. 2012] present a survey of security challenges and solutions for
federated clouds, describe some approaches to secure cloud federations, and discuss
future research directions. Singhal et al. [Singhal et al. 2013] discuss the problem of
addressing security, trust, privacy, and policy evaluation in the context of collaboration
in multicloud computing environments. They propose a proxy multicloud computing
framework supporting dynamic and runtime collaborations between cloud-based ser-
vices. Zhang and Reiter [Zhang and Reiter 2013] present Du¨ppel, a system enabling
tenant virtual machines to defend themselves from cache-based side-channel attacks
in public clouds. Their approach defends cloud tenants by automatically injecting noise
into the timings that an attacker observes from caches. Xu et al. [Xu et al. 2013b] intro-
duce an efficient integrity verification mechanism to secure computations outsourced
to the cloud. The proposed approach considers the outsourcing of the convex optimiza-
tion problem and analyzes mechanisms based on application-specific techniques for
efficient integrity verification. Wei et al. [Wei et al. 2013] propose a technique based on
scoped invariants to evaluate the integrity of cloud servers and software. The authors
provide a case study of the application of the proposed approach on the Xen Virtual Ma-
chine Manager. De Capitani di Vimercati et al. [De Capitani di Vimercati et al. 2014]
compare different solutions to protect outsourced data and enforce fine-grained and se-
lective access, and evaluate privacy issues that might arise. Some work has been also
done towards the development of resilient cloud services [Dsouza et al. 2013; Thebeau
II et al. 2014]. The solution in [Dsouza et al. 2013] is based on dynamic data driven
application system and moving target defence strategies to support resilient cloud ser-
vice development. The proposed approach makes the system execution environment
target of an attack dynamic, complicating exploits of vulnerabilities by attackers. It
is based on software behavior encryption, replication, diversity, and automated check-
pointing and recovery. In the same scenario, Thebeau II et al. [Thebeau II et al. 2014]
complement the work in [Dsouza et al. 2013] by providing a solution to define and
measure cyber resiliency of cloud applications. First they describe the components of
resiliency: attack surface, survivability, integrity, availability, and confidentiality. Then
they discuss their measurement and aggregation through a worked-out example.
B. SUMMARY OF REVIEWED PAPERS
Tables V and VI present a summary of reviewed papers according to the when, where,
what, how methodology in Section 2. In particular, each work has been categorized
according to i) the year and corresponding quarter in which it has been published
(when),4 ii) the attack surface targeted by the given solution (where),5 iii) the proper-
ties considered by the proposed solution (what), iv) the security/assurance techniques
at the basis of the proposed solution (how). In Tables V and VI,Xmeans that a specific
4We note that the year is presented in the first column of Tables V and VI within the references.
5We note that the attack surfaces (application-level, tenant-on-tenant, provider-on-tenant/tenant-on-
provider) refer to the set of resources owned by the corresponding actors (users, tenants, providers) and
target of the surveyed approaches.
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Table IV. Legenda for Tables V and VI
1QT=1st quarter of the year PC=Confidentiality AC=Access Control
2QT=2nd quarter of the year PI=Integrity AU=Authentication
3QT=3rd quarter of the year PA=Availability TC=Trusted Computing
4QT=4th quarter of the year PU=Authenticity M=Monitoring
AL=Application Level PP=Privacy AD=Audit/Compliance
TT=Tenant-on-Tenant E=Encryption SLA=Service Level Agreement
PT=Provider-on-Tenant S=Signature C=Certification
Tenant-on-Provider I=IDS/IPS T=Testing
Table V. Classification based on when, where, what, how dimensions
Reference (Year) When Where What How
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AL TT PT PC PI PA PU PP E S I AC AU TC M AD SLA C T
[Aceto et al. 2013] × X × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Ahmed et al. 2012] × × X × × X × X X X × × X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Alhamazani et al. 2013] × × × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Almulla and Yeun 2010] X X × × X × × X × × × × × X × × ∼ × × × × × ×
[Anisetti et al. 2014] × × X × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X × ×
[Attasena et al. 2013] × × X × × X X × X X × X X X × × × × × × × × ×
[Bacon et al. 2014] × × × × X X × X × × × × × × × X × × × ∼ × × ×
[Bai et al. 2011] × × × X X X X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Bai et al. 2013] × X × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Barsoum and Hasan 2013] × × × X × × X X X × X × X × × X X × × × × × ×
[Benali et al. 2010] × × X × X × × × × × × X × × X × × × × × × × ×
[Bennani et al. 2010] × × X × X X X X × × × × X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Bernsmed et al. 2011] × × X × X × × X X X X X × × × × × × ∼ × X × ×
[Bernsmed et al. 2012] × × × X X X × X X × × × X × × × × X × × X × ×
[Bertholon et al. 2011] × × X × × X × ∼ X × × × ∼ ∼ × × × X × × × X ×
[Birgisson et al. 2014] X × × × X × × X × × × X ∼ × × X × × × × × × ×
[Birnbaum et al. 2013] × X X × × X × X X × X × × × × × × ∼ X × × × ×
[Bleikertz et al. 2013] × X × × × X X X × × × X X × × × × X × × × × ×
[Bleikertz et al. 2012] × X × × × × X × X × × X × × × X × × × × × × ×
[Boampong and Wahsheh 2012] X × × × X X × X X × X × × × × × × X × × × × ×
[Bowers et al. 2009] × × × X × X × X X X × × X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Candea et al. 2010] × X × × X × × X X X X X × × × × × × × × × × X
[Casalicchio and Silvestri 2013] X × × × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X × ×
[Chan et al. 2009] × × × X X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Chauhan et al. 2013] × × × X X × X X X X X X × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Chonka et al. 2011] × × X × X X × × × X × × × × X × × × × × × × ×
[Chow et al. 2012] × × × × × X X X × × X X X X × × × × × × × × ×
[Christodorescu et al. 2009] × × × X × X × × X × × × × × X × × × ∼ × × × ×
[Chu et al. 2014] X × × × × X X X × × X × X × × × ∼ × × × × × ×
[Cimato et al. 2013] × X X × X X X × × × × × × × × × × ∼ ∼ × × X ∼
[Ciortea et al. 2010] X × × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[CSA 2014] × × × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
[De Capitani di Vimercati et al. 2013] × × X × × × X × X × × × X × × × × × × × × × ×
[De Capitani di Vimercati et al. 2014] × × × × X X X X × × × × X × × X × × × × × × ×
[Diallo et al. 2012] × X × × X × × × × × × X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Doelitzscher et al. 2012] × × × × X X × X X X X X × × × × × × ∼ X × × ×
[Doelitzscher et al. 2013] × × × × X X × X X X X X × × × × × × ∼ X × × ×
[Doelitzscher et al. 2013] × × × × X X × X X X X X × × × × × × ∼ X × × ×
[Dsouza et al. 2013] × × × × X × × X X X × × X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Ficco et al. 2013] × × × × X X X X X X × × × × X × × × × × × × ×
[Foster and Spanoudakis 2011a] X × × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X × ∼ × ×
[Foster and Spanoudakis 2011b] × X × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X × ∼ × ×
[Gao et al. 2011] × × X × X X X X X X X X × × × × × × × × × × X
[Garg et al. 2013] × X × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X × ×
[Ghazizadeh et al. 2012] × × × X X × × × × × X × × × × × X × × × × × ×
[Godfrey and Zulkernine 2013] × X × × × X × X × × × × × × × X × × × × × × ×
[Grobauer et al. 2011] × X X × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X ×
[Hao et al. 2011] × × X × X X X × X × X X × × × × X × × × × × ×
[Hanawa et al. 2010] × X × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Jajodia et al. 2013] × × × × × X X X × X × X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Jayasinghe et al. 2012] × X × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Jhawar and Piuri 2013] × × X × × X X × × X × × × × × × × × × × ∼ × ×
[Jhawar et al. 2012] × × × X X X × × × ∼ × ∼ × × × × × × × × × × ×
[Jin et al. 2013] × X × × × X × × × X × × × × × × × × × × X × ×
[Juels and Oprea 2013] X × × × × X × X X X × × X × × × × × × ∼ × × ×
[Jung et al. 2013] × X × × × × X × × × × X X × × X × × × × × × ×
[Kai et al. 2013] × × × X X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Kaaniche et al. 2013] × X × × X X X X × × × X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Khalid et al. 2013] × × X × X × × × × × × X × × × × X × × × × × ×
[Khan and Malluhi 2010] × × X X X X X X X X X X × × × ∼ × × × × × X ×
[King and Ganti 2010] × X × × X X X X X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Koeppe and Schneider 2010] × × × X × X X × × × × × × × × × × × X X X × X
[Krautheim 2009] × X × × X × X X X × × X × × × × × X × × × × ×
[Krotsiani et al. 2013] × × X × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × ∼ × × X ×
[Kurmus et al. 2011] × × × X × X × X X X × × × × × X × × × × × × ×
[Lang 2010] × × × X X × × X × × × × × × × X × × ∼ ∼ × × ×
[Lee et al. 2011] X × × × X X × × × × X × × × X × X × X × × × ×
[Li et al. 2011a] × X × × × X X X × × X × X × × × X × × × × × ×
[Li et al. 2011b] × X × × X X × X X × × × X × X X × × × × × × ×
[Li et al. 2013] × × × X × X X × × × × X × × × X × ∼ × × × × ×
[Lin and Tzeng 2012] × X × × × X X X × X × X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Liu et al. 2013] × × X × X X X X × × X ∼ × × × X × × × × × × ×
[Lombardi and Di Pietro 2010] X × × × × X × × X × × × × × × X × × X × × × ×
[Lombardi and Di Pietro 2011] × × X × × X × × X × × × × × × X × × X × × × ×
[Lu et al. 2014] × × × × X X X × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Luo et al. 2014] × × × × X × × X X × × × × × X × × × × × × × ×
[Ma et al. 2013] × × × X × X X X × X × × × × × × × X × × × × ×
[Mahmood et al. 2012] × X × × X X X X X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Marinescu et al. 2013] × × × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × × × ∼ × ×
[Massie et al. 2012] × × X × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Mei et al. 2013] × × X × X × X × × × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
[Meng and Liu 2013] × × X × X × X × × × × × × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Mohamaddiah et al. 2014] X × × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X × × × ×
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Table VI. Classification based on when, where, what, how dimensions (continued)
Reference (Year) When Where What How
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AL TT PT PC PI PA PU PP E S I AC AU TC M AD SLA C T
[Modi et al. 2013b] X × × × X X × X X X × × × × X × × × × × × × ×
[Monfared and Jaatun 2011] × × × X X X X X X X X X × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Moreno 2010] × × X × × X × × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Mouratidis et al. 2013] X × × × × × X X X X X X × × × × × × × × X × ×
[Mun˜oz and Man˜a 2013] × X × × X X X X X X X X × × × × × ∼ × × × X ×
[Nabeel et al. 2013] × × × X X X × X × × X × X × × X × × × × × × ×
[Nagios 2014] × × × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Ni et al. 2014] × × × × × X × X X × × X X × × × × × × X × × ×
[Okuhara et al. 2010] × × × X X × × X × × X × × × × X X × × × × × ×
[Pearson et al. 2009] × × × X X × × X × × × X X × × ∼ × × × × × × ×
[Park et al. 2013] × × X × × × X × X × × × X × × × × ∼ ∼ × ∼ × ×
[Parveen and Tilley 2010] × X × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Patel et al. 2013] X × × × X X × X X X × × × × X × × × × × × × ×
[Pattuk et al. 2013] × X × × X × ∼ X × × × X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Peterson 2010] × × X X X X × X X × X × X × × X X × ∼ ∼ × × ×
[Pham et al. 2011] × X × X X X X X X ∼ × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Qin et al. 2013] × X × × X X X X × × X × X X × × X × × × × × ×
[Rajkumar et al. 2013] × × × X × X × × X X × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
[Rao et al. 2013] X × × × × × X × × × × × × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Rasheed 2013] × × × X × X X × × × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
[Raykova et al. 2012] X × × × × × X ∼ × × × X ∼ × × X × × × × × × ×
[Ruj et al. 2014] X × × × X × × × × × X × × × × X × × × × × × ×
[Sakr and Liu 2012] × X × × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X × ×
[Santos et al. 2012] × × X × X X X X X × × × × × × × × X × × × × ×
[Sedayao et al. 2009] × × × X × X X X × × × × X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Shao et al. 2010] × × X × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Shetty 2013] × X X × × X × X X × × × × × ∼ × × × ∼ X × × ×
[Shraer et al. 2010] × × × X × × X × X × × × × X × × × × × × × × ×
[Singhal et al. 2013] X × × × X X X X X × × X × × ∼ X × X × × × × ×
[Song et al. 2009] × × × × X × × X × × X × × × × × X × × × × × ×
[Spanoudakis et al. 2012] × × X × X X X X X X X X × × × × × × × × × X ×
[Starov and Vilkomir 2013] × X × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Stefanov et al. 2012] × × × X × X X × X X X × × × × × X × × × × × ×
[Stolfo et al. 2012] × X × × X X × X × × × X × × X × × × × × × × ×
[Sulistio and Reich 2013] × × X × X × × X X X X X × × × × × × ∼ × X × ×
[Sundareswaran et al. 2012] × × X × × × X × × × ∼ × × × × × × × X × × × ×
[Sunyaev and Schneider 2013] X × × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X ×
[Szefer and Lee 2014] × × × × X X × X X × × X × × × × × X × × × × ×
[Takabi and Joshi 2012] X × × × X × × X × × × × × × × X × × × × × × ×
[Takabi et al. 2010a] × × X × X X X X × × X X × × × X X × × × × × ×
[Tang et al. 2012] × × × X X X × X × × X × X × × X × × × × × × ×
[Thebeau II et al. 2014] X × × × X × × X X X × × X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Tysowski and Hasan 2013] × × X × × × X X × × × X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Tsai et al. 2011] × X X × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[van Dijk et al. 2012] × × × X × × X X × × × × X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Velten and Stumpf 2013] × × × X × X X × X × × × × × × × × X × × × × ×
[Wan et al. 2012] × X × × X X × X × × X × X × × X × × × × × × ×
[Wang et al. 2013] × X × × X X X × X × × × × X × × × × × X × × ×
[Wang et al. 2010] X × × × X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X X × × ×
[Wang et al. 2010] X × × × × × X × X × × ∼ ∼ × × × × × × X × × ×
[Wang et al. 2011] × X × × × X X × X × × × ∼ ∼ × × × × × X × × ×
[Wang et al. 2012] × × X × × × X × × × × X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Wang et al. 2012] × X × × × × X × X × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
[Wang et al. 2013b] X × × × × × X × X × × ∼ ∼ × × × × × × X × × ×
[Wang et al. 2014] × × × × X × X × X × × X × ∼ × × × × × X × × ×
[Wang et al. 2013a] × × X × × × X × X × × X × X × × × × × × × × ×
[Wei and Reiter 2013] × × X × X X X × X × X X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Wei et al. 2013] × × × X X X × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×
[Wei et al. 2014] × X × × X X × × × × X X × × × × × × × X × × ×
[Wei and Reiter 2012] × × X × X X X × × × × X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Xing et al. 2013] X × × × X X X X X X X X × × X × × × × × × × ×
[Xu et al. 2013a] × × × X X × × × × × X × × X × × X × × × × × ×
[Xu et al. 2013b] × X × × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×
[Yang and Jia 2013] × × X × × X × X X × × X X × × × × × × X × × ×
[Yang et al. 2013] × X × × X X × X × × X × X × × X × × × × × × ×
[Ye et al. 2012] × × × X X X X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X ×
[Yu et al. 2013a] × × X × × × X × × × × X X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Yu et al. 2010a] × X × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Yu et al. 2010b] X × × × × X X X × × × X X × × X × × × × × × ×
[Yu et al. 2013b] × × × × X × × × × X × × × × X × × × × × × × ×
[Zawoad et al. 2013] × X × × X X X X X × × X × × × × × × × X × × ×
[Zech 2011] X × × × X X X X X X X × × × × × × × × × × × X
[Zhang and Reiter 2013] × × × X × X × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×
[Zhao et al. 2012] X × × × X × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × X × ×
[Zhu et al. 2013] × X × × × × X × X × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
[Zhu et al. 2012] X × × × X X × X × × × X X × × X × × × × × × ×
[Zissis and Lekkas 2012] X × × × X × × X X × X × X × × × × × × × × × ×
[Zou et al. 2013] × × × X × X X × × × × × × × × × × X X × × × ×
aspect is completely supported, ∼ means that it is supported but it is not the focus of
the paper, × means that it is not supported.
C. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING SURVEYS AND WHITEPAPERS
After an initial period in which much cloud research and development have been de-
voted to the design, implementation, and refinement of basic cloud functionalities, in
the last few years a lot of work has been done to secure the cloud and its users. Many
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scientific articles have been published in international journals and conferences, and
several surveys have tried to show an overall picture of the status of cloud security.
Fernandes et al. [Fernandes et al. 2013] provide a survey of cloud security solu-
tions, which considers different key topics, including vulnerabilities, threats, and at-
tacks, and proposes a taxonomy for their classification. The paper includes one of the
most complete description of vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks to cloud infrastruc-
tures, characterizing them on the basis of their attack surface. The authors also re-
port on the trend of cloud security publications between 2008-2012. Subashini and
Kavitha [Subashini and Kavitha 2011] review security risks that could influence cus-
tomer and provider activities in a cloud environment. They distinguish between se-
curity issues that affect IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS offerings. Considering IaaS level, the
main problems for developers lie in the virtualization techniques and in the storage
mechanisms used on physical hardware. At PaaS level, developers enjoy some degree
of freedom for application management and deployment on top of the platform, while
“under the hood” security issues are left in the provider’s hands. In addition, security
risks vary depending on the deployment model (private, public, and hybrid clouds) and
are influenced by concerns similar to the ones faced by the traditional Internet infras-
tructure. Also at SaaS level clients must rely on security mechanisms implemented
by the cloud provider. However, in SaaS scenario, it is even more difficult for users to
evaluate the level of assurance and security guaranteed by the provider.6 The authors
claim that 14 key security elements must be considered at SaaS level: i) data security,
ii) network security, iii) data locality, iv) data integrity, v) data segregation, vi) data
access, vii) authentication and authorization, viii) data confidentiality, ix) web appli-
cation security, x) data breaches, xi) virtualization vulnerability, xii) availability, xiii)
backup, xiv) identity management and sign-on process. Hashizume et al. [Hashizume
et al. 2013] analyze vulnerabilities, threats and attacks in the cloud, and outline pos-
sible countermeasures against them. At the end of 2012, Ryan [Ryan 2013] presented
an overview of security in cloud computing focusing on open challenges. He identified
four research directions in the context of confidentiality at SaaS level: fully homo-
morphic encryption, key translation in the browser, hardware-anchored security, and
query processing over encrypted databases. Other work focuses on security at IaaS
level [Dahbur et al. 2011; Dawoud et al. 2010]. Dahbur et al. [Dahbur et al. 2011]
consider IaaS-level risks, threats, and vulnerabilities. Dawoud et al. [Dawoud et al.
2010] listed some typical security problems of IaaS implementation and deployment,
and proposed some initial solutions. Vaquero et al. [Vaquero et al. 2011] discuss the
impact of multi-tenancy on cloud security at IaaS level and remark that the major-
ity of solutions include access control and encryption mechanisms, trying to guaran-
tee well-known Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) properties. Donevski et
al. [Donevski et al. 2013] provide a security assessment methodology focusing on se-
curity threats posed by other tenants or other actors outside the cloud. The proposed
methodology is tested on OpenStack [OpenStack Open Source Cloud Computing Soft-
ware 2015], an open source IaaS solution for the cloud. Halton et al. [Halton and Rah-
man 2012] present a set of best practices for the integration and management of cloud
security. Brender and Markov [Brender and Markov 2013] present a real study on
risk perception and management in cloud computing, focusing on Swiss companies.
Bouchenak et al. [Bouchenak et al. 2013] take a wider approach, and analyze existing
tools for the verification of both functional and non-functional properties in the cloud,
discussing challenges and new research directions.
In the line of the work discussed above, several whitepapers were published by
stakeholder organizations. CSA released a set of security best practices for the
6We note that this problem paves the way to assurance solutions described in Section 5.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
:44 C.A. Ardagna et al.
cloud [Cloud Security Alliance 2010; 2011]. In [Cloud Security Alliance 2010], CSA
discusses guidelines for Identity and Access Management (IAM) in the cloud, which
are fundamental for correct management of cloud services. In [Cloud Security Al-
liance 2011], a more general approach is taken, where cloud security guidelines are
provided for critical areas focusing on 14 domains of interest. For each domain (e.g.,
governance and enterprise risk management, compliance and audit management, en-
cryption and key management), a set of recommendations is provided. In turn, Trend-
Micro also published a whitepaper [Trend Micro 2013] discussing best practices for
security and compliance with Amazon Web Services, while German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) released a set of security recommendations for cloud com-
puting providers [German Federal Office for Information Security 2012]. Similarly, the
Cloud Standards Customer Council [Cloud Standards Customer Council 2012] listed
the following 10 steps for achieving security in the cloud: i) ensure that effective gov-
ernance, risk and compliance processes are in place, ii) audit operational and business
processes, iii)manage people, roles, and identities, iv) ensure proper protection of data
and information, v) enforce privacy policies, vi) assess security provisioning for cloud
applications, vii) ensure that cloud networks and connections are secure, viii) evaluate
security controls on physical infrastructures and facilities, ix) manage security terms
in the cloud SLA, x) understand the security requirements of the exit process.
Some papers have surveyed together cloud security and privacy [Jansen and Grance
2011; Pearson 2013; Pearson and Benameur 2010; Takabi et al. 2010b; Xiao and Xiao
2013; Zhou et al. 2010]. Pearson et al. [Pearson et al. 2009] discuss how the concepts
of privacy, security, and trust evolve with the advent of cloud, and outline possible
approaches to their protection and management. Xiao and Xiao [Xiao and Xiao 2013]
provide an extensive and complete overview of vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses
in the context of cloud security and privacy. Similarly to our approach, this survey
is organized according to security and privacy properties, and for each of them cor-
responding vulnerabilities, threats, and defenses are reviewed and analyzed. Zhou et
al. [Zhou et al. 2010] first give an overview of security considering availability, confi-
dentiality, data integrity, control, and audit in the cloud; then they show how existing
approaches to privacy are doomed to fail in the cloud environment. Bohli et al. [Bohli
et al. 2013] provide a survey of security and privacy solutions that build on the concept
of simultaneous usage of multiple clouds. National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) [Jansen and Grance 2011] proposes a set of guidelines for achieving
security and privacy in public cloud environments. Burger et al. [Burger et al. 2013]
present a whitepaper from the TClouds project, whose aim is to provide the build-
ing blocks to implement a trustworthy cloud infrastructure. Other surveys focus on
finer-grained aspects of cloud security like storage security [Aguiar et al. 2013; Paladi
et al. 2013], virtualization security [Pearce et al. 2013; Perez-Botero et al. 2013], SaaS
security in multi-tenant software platforms [Rodero-Merino et al. 2012], intrusion de-
tection/prevention systems [Modi et al. 2013b]. Takahashi et al. [Takahashi et al. 2012]
analyze the problem of guaranteeing security in a cloud multi-tenancy scenario. They
explore the implication multi-tenancy could have on cloud security, and discuss the
technical maturity of security approaches for multi-tenant cloud computing. In par-
ticular, they consider security issues at the following layers: hardware and software
primitive layer, hypervisor layer, OS layer, application layer, and web security.
Iankoulova and Daneva [Iankoulova and Daneva 2012] point out that each cloud
security solution focuses on a small subset of heterogeneous security requirements.
Then, they focus on identifying general security requirements for cloud security and
categorizing some of existing techniques based on them. In particular, they clas-
sify security requirements in 9 sub-areas: access control, attack/harm detection, non-
repudiation, integrity, security auditing, physical protection, privacy, recovery, and
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. , No. , Article , Publication date: August 2014.
From Security to Assurance in the Cloud: A Survey :45
prosecution, where non-repudiation, physical protection, recovery, and prosecution
count the smallest number of solutions, while access control, integrity, and auditability
are the most researched sub-areas.
Our survey takes a different approach and studies the trend of cloud security assur-
ance technique definition, with respect to the overall trend in cloud security solution
definition, in the last few years (see Section 6.1).
D. STANDARDS AND PROJECTS
In this section, we complete our overview on the state of the art of cloud security and
assurance by briefly reviewing existing cloud security standards, and research and
development projects in the context of cloud security and assurance.
D.1. Standards
Many standards have been defined and are available for service-based ecosystems and
distributed systems in general. Some of these standards might fit cloud requirements,
while some others could require modifications to be applied in a cloud scenario. Some
standards instead are completely missing and need to be designed from scratch to fit
the cloud requirements.
In this context, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [ETSI
2013] has led the effort done by the Cloud Standards Coordination (CSC) task force
towards cloud standardization.7 ETSI, a not-for-profit European Standards Organiza-
tion recognized by the European Union that focuses on the specification of standards
for ICT, has been in fact appointed by the European Commission to coordinate with
stakeholders in the cloud standards ecosystems and devise standards roadmaps in
support of EU policy in critical areas such as security, interoperability, data portabil-
ity, and reversibility. The ETSI effort started at the end of 2012 and identified three
main Technical Groups (TGs), namely, stakeholder roles and responsibilities (TG1),
use cases selection/prioritization (TG2), and specification identification and gap anal-
ysis (TG3); TG3 was composed of three subgroups on: i) SLAs, ii) security and privacy,
iii) interoperability, data portability, reversibility. The main goal of TG1 was the def-
inition of all actors and parties involved in a cloud computing environment, having a
role in the ETSI standardization process. Starting from the roles and responsibilities
identified in TG1, the main goal of TG2 was the definition of a set of use cases and
related requirements that can be of interest in a cloud computing environment. The
main goal of TG3 was to analyze the use cases delivered by TG2, and identify existing
standards and specifications that are relevant to cloud. In this context, TG3 surveyed
these standards and identified existing gaps in their definition. The results of the work
done by ETSI have been reported in [ETSI 2013]. After identifying use cases of interest
for the cloud and their impact on standardization, the presented document maps the
activities of the use cases on existing standards, specifications, reports, and whitepa-
pers. Then, lessons learned, including a discussion of covered aspects and gaps, are
provided. Finally, two annexes provide extensive and complete lists of standards, spec-
ifications, reports, and whitepapers that clearly present the status and landscape of
cloud standards.
Following and completing the ETSI effort, a number of EU FP7 projects (AS-
SERT4SOA, Aniketos, Cirrus, CUMULUS, SPaCIoS, NeSSOS and SecCORD – see
Appendix D.2) worked together to provide a gap analysis on cloud and service stan-
dardization in the context of assurance and certification techniques. The document,
which has been presented to ETSI, is available at [Aniketos, ASSERT4SOA, CUMU-
LUS, SecCord 2013].
7http://csc.etsi.org/website/home.aspx
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Finally, it is important to mention the ISO/IEC 27018 “Code of practice for data
protection controls for public cloud computing services” standard that will provide
guidance on the privacy elements/aspects of public clouds. It is accompanied by
ISO/IEC 27017 covering the wider information security angles. ISO/IEC 27018 is not
intended to duplicate or modify ISO/IEC 27002 in relation to cloud computing, but it
will add control objectives and controls relevant to the protection of privacy and per-
sonal data in the cloud.
D.2. Projects
In the last years, several organizations and research projects have focused on increas-
ing the security of distributed systems in general and cloud computing in particular.
Among them, NIST [Jansen and Grance 2011; Mell and Grance 2011] first focused on
the definition of main cloud concepts, roles, and fundamentals, and then distributed a
set of recommendations (NIST SP-800-144) on security and privacy in the cloud. Fol-
lowing a similar approach, ENISA focused on security assurance and risk evaluation
in the cloud [Catteddu and Hogben 2009a; 2009b] and on security SLAs and security
monitoring [Dekker and Hogben 2011; Hogben and Dekker 2012]. As already men-
tioned in this survey, CSA has been very active in analyzing security, privacy, and trust
issues in the cloud [Cloud Security Alliance 2010; 2011]. Finally, the Federal Risk and
Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) provided a standardized approach to
security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring for cloud products and
services. In particular, it released a document describing best practices for acquiring
IT as a service [CIO 2012].
In addition to the above efforts, several EU FP7 research projects focused on in-
creasing security of distributed systems. Early projects focused on securing SOA and
their applications. ASSERT4SOA [Advanced Security Service cERTificate for SOA
2010] was aimed at supporting new certification scenarios, where the security certi-
fication of services is required and plays a major role. ASSERT4SOA has produced
novel techniques, tools, and an architecture for expressing, assessing, and certifying
security properties for complex service-oriented applications, composed of distributed
software services that may dynamically be selected, assembled and replaced, and run-
ning within complex and continuously evolving software ecosystems. SLA@SOI [Em-
powering the service industry with SLA-aware infrastructures 2008] focused on the de-
sign and implementation of an architecture and different approaches for the manage-
ment of SLAs in service-oriented and cloud infrastructures. It also defined a language
called SLA-* supporting the description of generic SLAs and provided a suite of open
source software supporting the implementation of SLA-aware services. PoSecCo [Pol-
icy and Security Configuration Management 2010] analyzed the problem of security
compliance and automatic security configuration of services. In particular, it focuses
on refining high-level security requirements in abstract low-level security configura-
tions, using a product-independent syntax and format. Low-level configurations are
then mapped and translated to fit the actual system syntax, format, and require-
ments. PoSecCo also provided solutions for the maintenance of such configurations
in the final product. ANIKETOS [Ensuring Trustworthiness and Security in Service
Composition 2010] considered the problem of ensuring security and trustworthiness of
services, which are composed dynamically at runtime. It provided methods to analyze
new threats and vulnerabilities, and solve them by providing a platform for security
and trust management of composite services. SPaCIoS [Secure Provision and Con-
sumption in the Internet of Services 2010] focused on the validation and verification
of services both at static (before service provisioning) and production (after service de-
ployment) time. The project aimed to provide new techniques for service validation
and verification based on penetration testing, security testing, model checking, and
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automatic learning. In turn, Nessos [Network of Excellence on Engineering Secure
Future Internet Software Services and Systems 2010] has analyzed the problem of en-
gineering secure software-based services and systems. The project vision is based on
the idea that this kind of goal can be only achieved by addressing security concerns
from the beginning of system analysis and design. This approach can in fact reduce
the probability of service vulnerabilities and integrate security treatment within the
engineering process.
More recently, other EU FP7 research projects focused on defining solutions and in-
frastructures to secure the cloud. CloudSec [CloudSec 2013] is a joint research project
between Telenor and SINTEF, which has prepared a checklist for cloud security. The
project allows customers to identify their requirements on cloud providers and compare
them on the basis of a systematic approach. CIRRUS [Certification, InteRnationalisa-
tion and standaRdization in cloUd Security 2012] focuses on solutions for security and
privacy in cloud computing. It aims to address those security and privacy concerns in-
troduced by the need of moving sensitive services and data to the cloud, migrating data
between different cloud providers, and facilitating businesses in joining the cloud in-
frastructure. CIRRUS launched the CEN/CENELEC workshop on Requirements and
Recommendations for Assurance in the Cloud (CEN-WS RACS) [CEN 2014] aimed to
provide recommendations for future cloud assurance standards. A4Cloud [Cloud Ac-
countability Project 2012] deals with audit and accountability in the cloud. It is aimed
at increasing trust in the cloud, by producing approaches and tools that allow cloud
providers to be accountable for the privacy and confidentiality of information. These
approaches and tools include risk analysis, policy enforcement, monitoring, and com-
pliance auditing. SPECS [Secure Provisioning of Cloud Services based on SLA man-
agement 2013] focuses on the realization of a framework supporting techniques and
tools for user-centric negotiation of security parameters in SLA, monitoring-based ver-
ification of SLAs, and enforcement of SLAs in the cloud. CUMULUS [Certification
infrastrUcture for MUlti-layer cloUd Services 2013] comes as an extension to the work
done in ASSERT4SOA and aims to provide a new security certification scheme for
the cloud. CUMULUS is focusing on developing an integrated framework of models,
processes, and tools supporting the certification of security properties at infrastruc-
ture (IaaS), platform (PaaS), and software application (SaaS) layers. Its final goal is
to put service users, service providers, and cloud suppliers together with certification
authorities to ensure security certificate validity in the cloud. Broker@Cloud [Con-
tinuous Quality Assurance and Optimisation for Cloud brokers 2012] focuses on pro-
viding an enhanced brokerage framework allowing cloud intermediaries to support
continuous quality assurance and optimization of service-based software in the cloud.
Finally, RESERVOIR [Resources and Services Virtualization without Barriers 2008]
demonstrates how virtual machines could be migrated between different hosts, en-
ables smaller infrastructure providers to collaborate through the federation of their
resources on demand, and provides first approaches to cloud elasticity.
Finally, also research projects funded by the US National Science Foundation (NSF)
focused on different aspects of cloud security and assurance. To name but a few, Secure
Data-Intensive Computing on Hybrid Clouds project [Secure Data-Intensive Comput-
ing on Hybrid Clouds 2012] considers the problems of i) protecting privacy of data
intensive computations in the cloud and ii) increasing privacy assurance on data man-
agement practices. Secure and Privacy-assured Data Service Outsourcing in Cloud
Computing project [Secure and Privacy-assured Data Service Outsourcing in Cloud
Computing 2012] aims to provide a security- and privacy-enhanced outsourcing solu-
tion for the cloud based on an encrypted cloud data service, a cloud data sharing ser-
vice, and a privacy-preserving secure cloud storage auditing. Infrastructure for Secure
Cloud Computing project [Infrastructure for Secure Cloud Computing 2013] focuses
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on securing two important aspects of the cloud: resource sharing and fine-grained
pricing. Risk Assessment Techniques for Off-line and On-line Security Evaluation of
Cloud Computing project [Risk Assessment Techniques for Off-line and On-line Secu-
rity Evaluation of Cloud Computing 2013] considers the need of a security risk evalua-
tion framework for cloud computing. It focuses on off-line risk management and on-line
trust evaluation, and aims to support users in the evaluation of cloud service/resource
trustworthiness. Cloud Security on Demand project [Cloud Security on Demand 2012]
proposes a solution to on-demand security, where security requirements and policies
are automatically mapped on appropriate cloud deployments and their support contin-
uously verified at runtime.
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